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1F O R E W O R D 
 We have known Moe Coleman for 30 and 50 years, respectively, 
and we are honored to write a brief foreword to this reflective work 
that recounts important civic events in Moe’s life and those events in 
the City of Pittsburgh’s history that bear the mark of his insightful 
ideas. In his calm and discerning way, Moe helped to shape many of 
these events, both as a participant and as an advisor, counselor, and 
teacher. As foundation executives, we were lucky to have worked with 
him in each of these roles. Moe changed the way we and many others 
approached our work, established new networks for us, and pointed 
out how to work with neighborhoods in new and truly innovative ways. 
 Moe’s reflections covering 60 years describe important intersec-
tions and critical turning points in the history and transformation 
of this region—and not from the vantage point of a passive observer. 
Key issues six decades ago that were in the way of progress are still 
with us today, just in different form.  
 Moe’s recollections help us to understand better how a previous 
generation found common ground on many of these challenges and 
provide insights on how the work could continue. Policy changes result 
from many factors and almost always involve compromise reached by 
people with disparate points of view. Moe’s writing shows a master 
at work, not self-appointed, but one who was sought out to convene, 
moderate, and inform. His convenings were characterized by good data 
analysis and a decorum of respectful dialogue. His gift for synthesizing 
and summarizing complicated data sets is as relevant today as it was 
in the 1960s, when he worked in the office of Pittsburgh Mayor Joe Barr. 
 Moe’s contributions to our community cannot be overstated. From 
his earliest days as a youth worker in the Hill District in the 1950s,  
he witnessed the impact of urban renewal on families, and for the next 
50 years, as a social worker; professor; and advisor to elected officials 
and community, civic, and business leaders, he fostered communication 
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across race and class lines to support hiring among underrepresented 
groups; union membership; fair housing; and access to quality and 
equal education, health care, and human services. The telling of  
his story from his days as a civil rights worker to his days with the 
Institute of Politics provides a unique window into Pittsburgh’s  
culture with an intimate understanding of what it was like to live, 
work, and play in the Pittsburgh region set in the context of the  
social, economic, and political events that shaped our region and  
Moe Coleman.  
 Finding Common Ground is not a long read, but it should not  
be a quick one. It is deep with historical insight and anecdotal detail. 
While it covers a period of more than half a century, its content is  
as much a civic blueprint for future direction as it is an affectionate 
array of reflections on the past. It embodies our wish to nourish  
present and future generations of our region with the knowledge  
of the past through the memory of a great man and the inheritance  
of a great example.  
 And it is designed to educate future leaders about their leader-
ship responsibilities as citizens; engage students in understanding 
how government functions; and empower young citizens and others  
to make positive, lasting contributions to the civic and political health 
of our communities, commonwealth, and nation.  
 Recognizing and honoring the legacy of Moe Coleman will set  
a standard for service, encourage a sustained commitment to civic 
participation, and inspire others to make service a central part of 
their lives. 
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Introduction: Reflections from the Middle
 The last half century has been a period of vast, intense social 
change. Civil rights movements have changed how groups relate  
to each other, public policy has changed what we expect from our  
government, technology has transformed how we communicate  
and obtain information, and various trends have caused our urban  
centers to experience decades of gradual decline (followed by recent, 
encouraging signs of reinvigoration). 
 In the last 60 years, I can see clearly the cumulative impact of 
change. My daily life experience is enormously different from that  
of my grandparents, and my children and grandchildren’s world is  
already far different from mine. Yet, at the same time, in this power-
fully turbulent environment, I see signs of stability, too. I have been  
a student or faculty member at the University of Pittsburgh for a good 
portion of the last 62 years. I have been married to the same woman 
for more than 60 years. I live 10 minutes away from where I grew up, 
and I have friends dating back to elementary school. 
 The communities where I have worked also have undergone  
a mixture of change and stability. In my personal life, the aspects  
of stability have equipped me to react and adapt to change. In dis-
advantaged communities, stability often has been fleeting, creating 
greater tension in how the community reacts to new situations,  
resists unwanted forms of change, or maintains viability in the midst  
of change. 
 The chance to teach and shape the trajectories of hundreds of  
gifted students as a university professor has been immensely rewarding,  
but the aspects of my career that may be of public interest involve  
my interaction with various communities in times of change. These 
experiences can be arranged in four chapters of my life: 
4 1. My work as a community organizer at two Pittsburgh settle-  
  ment houses amidst upheaval due to urban development and   
  major changes in the racial makeup of the neighborhoods  
  I served (approximately 1954–61) 
 2. My involvement in neighborhood development issues,  
  first at the Kingsley settlement house and the Pittsburgh  
  Department of City Planning (1959–64) and then through  
  my interaction with community development organizations  
  and as a consultant to Henry Ford II in Detroit, Mich. 
 3. My time as an aide to Pittsburgh Mayor Joseph Barr (1964–69)— 
  years dominated by Great Society programs, the civil rights  
  movement, desegregation, and Vietnam War protests 
 4. My attempts at community consensus building, first as  
  executive of the Hartford Process in Hartford, Conn., (1977–1980), 
  and then at the University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics, 
  which I founded in 1989 and with which I remain active as   
  director emeritus
 While some of the basic tenets of my youth seem less certain as  
I grow older, I believe that the core values of my professional life have 
remained consistent over these 60 years. One important issue was the 
focus of my attention: how to find common ground and help communities 
resolve contentious issues. Repeatedly, I found myself negotiating con-
flicts between competing values: new development versus community 
integrity, comprehensive planning versus local decision making, justice 
for underrepresented populations versus opportunity for struggling 
working-class Whites, or Republican versus Democratic political leaders. 
And repeatedly I chose to submerge my own strong political and social 
views in order to play a credible, neutral mediating role, because, in 
most cases, I saw that role going unfilled. I believe that the need for 
such mediating influences is even greater today, as our political envi-
ronment has become increasingly polarized, with both conservative  
and liberal perspectives becoming hardened by the echo chambers  
of ideologically skewed media outlets. 
5 My adoption of a mediating role rests on one crucial premise:  
that compromise is needed in some circumstances. I am not referring 
to moral compromise. I recognize that some issues—slavery, abortion, 
and civil rights, for example—do not lend themselves to compromise 
because of their perceived moral content and the lack of common 
ground between combatants. This is why these issues strain our  
democracy to an extent that budget debates do not. Rather, by 
“compromise,” I refer here to negotiated settlements, usually over  
distribution of material resources or political influence, among  
competing entities in the public sphere. 
 A strategy of making public decisions through consensus and 
compromise offers the potential for strengthening communities by 
expressing respect for differences and by enabling all groups to feel 
that their concerns have been heard and (at least in part) addressed. 
But this strategy has weaknesses as well. Calling for a compromise 
among various groups implies that each participating group has some 
valid claim for resources or something useful to offer, an implication 
that is not necessarily always true. Moreover, as James Madison 
implicitly recognized in the Federalist Papers and as Robert Dahl  
articulated more rigorously in Who Governs?, the results of compro-
mise are not, in any inherent sense, fair; on the contrary, they are 
skewed in favor of the group with the greatest influence, resources,  
or intensity of commitment. 
 Nevertheless, on major issues of broad public concern, there is 
rarely a better alternative than compromise. Disputes can be resolved 
in one of three ways: one group overwhelms the other (e.g., by force), 
one group leaves the playing field (e.g., by relocating), or the groups 
work out a deal. Much of my professional activity has been dedicated 
to achieving consensus and mutually acceptable resolutions of public 
issues—and to ensuring that all stakeholders are represented at the 
table, because if voices are silenced in the process, the final outcome 
is not likely to take everyone’s concerns into account. 
6 Throughout the chapters that follow, the theme of creating safe  
places for dialogue and compromise recurs often. To add both color and 
breadth of insight to the narrative, I have not limited my storytelling  
to my direct personal experiences. Rather, I also have interviewed more 
than 20 people whose lives were intertwined with mine and have inter-
woven parts of their stories with my story. I offer policy observations at 
the close of each chapter and concluding reflections in the final chapter. 
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Charitable Islands in a Time of Change:  
Settlement Houses in 1950s Pittsburgh
 I always had a liberal ideology and was a strong believer in civil 
rights, but in reality, I had hardly any firsthand knowledge of poverty 
or of the African American community. Growing up in Pittsburgh in 
the ’40s and early ’50s, I was living in a de facto and, in some cases, 
a de jure segregated city. The contrast was great, as the country had 
just finished fighting a war to preserve democracy with a segregated 
military. I attended the Pittsburgh Public Schools from kindergarten 
through the 12th grade, and I never had an African American teacher 
or administrator. I then attended the University of Pittsburgh for four 
years and never had an African American teacher or administrator. 
Neither the Pitt basketball team nor the football team had African 
American players until Jimmy Joe Robinson and Herb Douglas, both 
of whom were amazing athletes. (Reverend Robinson and I are close 
friends, and I have a deep admiration for his courage, commitment, 
and accomplishments in achieving social justice.) 
 When I went shopping with my mother in the five downtown  
department stores, there were no African American clerks. The  
public sector also was segregated. For instance, Allegheny County 
had one swimming pool known as “the Inkwell” that was only for 
Blacks. The Pittsburgh city pools were only for Whites, and later  
became the subject of great controversy. These are only a few  
examples of a segregated city. 
 My isolation from the African American community ended when  
I was hired as a community organizer at the Anna B. Heldman  
settlement in the Hill District, where my firsthand knowledge of the 
African American community began. 
8 Historically, the Hill District was a classic melting pot, with  
Jewish, Italian, and Syrian immigrants as well as African Americans 
who had relocated from the South; my own father had settled in the 
Hill upon immigrating to Pittsburgh in 1913. However, upon arriving 
at the Heldman settlement in 1954, I found myself at a facility that 
was adjusting to significant change due to urban redevelopment and 
the neighborhood’s changing racial composition. 
From White to Black
 The Heldman House was an evolving descendant of the settle- 
ment house movement, which began in the 1880s. Drawing on a  
British model, settlement houses in the United States brought  
socially concerned members of the middle and upper classes to live 
in poor, urban neighborhoods, often populated by recent immigrants 
with limited English skills. Hull House in Chicago, opened by Jane 
Addams and Ellen Gates Starr in 1889, was the most famous of the 
approximately 400 settlement houses founded in the late 1800s and 
early 1900s, primarily in northeastern and midwestern U.S. cities. 
These houses typically provided child care, educational, artistic,  
and recreational programs; in addition, the houses’ administrators 
and staff actually resided in the neighborhood, seeking to befriend the 
poor and understand their plight, not simply to offer them charity. 
Many of them became ardent promoters of social reform. 
 Initially, both the benefactors and the beneficiaries of the settle-
ment houses were overwhelmingly Caucasian. The houses responded 
in varying ways to the in-migration of African Americans: Some sold 
their buildings and moved out, some became integrated, and some 
resisted integration. By the 1950s, few staff members still lived in 
settlement houses, which had largely turned into—or were on their 
way to being replaced by—community centers. 
 Founded by a Jewish women’s organization as the Columbian 
Council School in 1895 and renamed the Irene Kaufmann Settlement 
9in 1909, this house had served a Jewish clientele for more than  
50 years. But after World War II, Jewish families began to migrate 
to neighborhoods further east of downtown, and African Americans 
moved into the Hill. Census data show that the White population  
in the vicinity of the Kaufmann Settlement plummeted from 7,619  
in 1950 to 2,185, or less than 10 percent of the total neighborhood 
population, in 1960.  
 By the early 1950s, as African American lawyer and civil rights 
advocate Wendell Freeland recalled, a committee report concluded 
that Jewish philanthropic organizations should shift their focus to  
the eastern neighborhoods, where many Jewish families were moving. 
Freeland was recruited as president of a new, predominantly Black 
board, initially a subsidiary to the Irene Kaufmann board, that  
would take over operation of the settlement house. 
 “Bringing Negroes onto that board was not an easy thing,”  
Freeland said. “There were many instances of resentment against the 
Kaufmann Settlement because of its racial policies.” The recreational 
facilities of this exquisitely constructed five-story structure, which 
included a large gymnasium and an Olympic-size pool with a mosaic 
tile floor, had long been off limits to African Americans. 
 According to Freeland, Jewish leaders called for another name 
change to ensure that funds going to the settlement house would no 
longer be perceived as benefiting the Jewish community. To remake 
the house’s image, Freeland and his board selected a new name,  
honoring Anna Heldman, known as the “Angel on the Hill” for her 
service as a Kaufmann Settlement nurse for 38 years until her death 
in 1940. During this period, Freeland also oversaw a turnover in staff, 
as African Americans worked alongside a remaining contingent of 
Jewish professionals, all directed by Sidney Lindenberg. The hiring  
of African American staff members who knew the community, such as 
basketball star Erwin Stewart as recreation director, helped to persuade 
local Blacks that the house had become a safe place for them. 
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 One of the first African American hires was social worker Anne 
Jones, who arrived at Heldman in the early 1950s and said that she 
learned only later that “they took me because I came so cheap.”  
Jones recalled that the center had an amazing array of community  
activities, including music, dance, crafts, child care, a well-baby clinic, 
a boxing gym, one of the first interracial theater groups in the city, 
and one of the first interracial summer programs. Jones added that 
her boss, Heldman social services director Liz Bulluck, “insisted that 
we get to know the families” of the youths they served. 
 Both racial and functional changes were still in process when I  
arrived at Heldman in 1956. While the staff at Heldman was uniformly 
excellent, Jones, who would later become the University of Pittsburgh 
School of Social Work’s first director of undergraduate studies, was 
one of the most capable social workers I have ever met. She had an 
amazing ability to relate to the membership, and her obvious love  
of books motivated young people in the Hill to use the public library 
and become better readers. I personally benefited from her skill in  
defusing tense situations. In one such instance, when I tried to enforce 
Heldman House etiquette by asking a young man to remove his hat  
at a dance, he drew a knife. Happily, Jones was there to intervene 
and promptly calmed him down.
An Oasis on a Disrupted Hill
 The complex, evolving, multiethnic dynamics of the Hill were  
further disrupted when city government pushed through a plan to 
raze the lower Hill District to make room for the Civic Arena and 
accompanying developments. The resulting removal of housing  
(some substandard) displaced hundreds of poor families, many of 
whom crowded into what was left of the Hill. The Heldman House 
became a welcoming oasis for confused young people like Samuel 
Howze, who (after changing his name to Sala Udin) would become  
a fighter for desegregation in the South and, later, a prominent  
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Pittsburgh civil rights leader and city council member. Here’s how 
Udin remembered those days: 
 
 We lived in the Hill District from 1943 [when Udin was born]   
 to 1953 and then, when we were displaced by the development  
 making way for the Civic Arena, we moved up into the public  
 housing projects. Each of the projects had a basement apart- 
 ment set aside as a recreation center for the kids in that  
 project community. The staff at the recreation center took  
 groups of us down to the “Ikes” [the popular nickname of  
 the Irene Kaufmann Settlement], which was like the grand- 
 daddy of the neighborhood recreation centers. They introduced 
 us to the staff and got us involved in programs at the house. 
 
 The programs I remember most were the after-school education   
 programs. Somehow they knew what our homework was supposed  
 to be, and they made sure that we had done it. We were not  
 allowed to participate in any of the play activities  until our  
 homework was done. After homework, we were allowed to get  
 involved in recreational activities. Probably the most important 
 activity I got involved in there was a neighborhood fraternity   
 called Alpha Nu Omega, where we learned appropriate behavior   
 through community service and other social activities. I also  
 went to dances there as part of learning how to socialize. 
 
 I had been dislocated from the only place I knew as home, and  
 the  “Ikes” was a way of resettling me in a new community.  
 It was a safe house, and neighborhood feuds were left at the door.   
 Anyone from any neighborhood was welcome and treated well.   
 The workers were just outstanding. They weren’t just staff;  
 they were surrogate parents. They would tell us, “You’re not in  
 the street now; you’re in the Ikes, and you will carry yourself   
 appropriately.” They knew us by name and knew our families. 
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 The building was huge. I had never seen anything that big.   
 There was nothing so imposing in the Hill District. Sure, we   
 could look downtown and see those buildings, but this was like   
 a downtown building in the neighborhood, with the big columns   
 holding it up and the gigantic doors so you knew you were walking  
 into someplace really impressive.
Not an Easy Job
 Like Jones, I too encountered Bulluck’s high standards as I  
commenced my new responsibilities as a community organizer at  
Heldman. We were expected not only to work with both children and 
adults but also to make home visits and be visible in the community. 
We started at mid-morning and worked until 9 or 10 p.m., plus weekends. 
 I also faced some mild resentment, as some African Americans 
wondered why a White man had been tapped for this community orga-
nizing position while limited opportunities were available for African 
Americans, but Bulluck wanted to retain a diverse staff. The holdovers 
from the Kaufmann staff included Joseph “Ziggy” Kahn, a former boxer 
and 14th Ward (Squirrel Hill) Democratic Committee chairperson  
who ran the gym program, and music director Anna Perlow. Although 
Pittsburgh was a highly segregated city, the sharp racial polarization 
that would typify the late 1960s had not yet materialized; for example, 
the Heldman House operated a high-quality interracial preschool. 
 The Heldman had beautiful facilities—and it didn’t need tight  
security to keep them beautiful. The game room, with mahogany paneling, 
leather chairs, and high-quality pool tables, was open to teenagers every 
night with minimal supervision, and vandalism never once occurred. 
The young people respected the quality of the place and treated it as 
if it was their own. Alcohol was occasionally a problem, and numbers 
games were prevalent—I can remember hearing older women at  
Heldman House’s sewing classes talk about their “dream books” that 
promised insights on what number to play—but drugs and guns  
were not.
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Playing It Safe
 The Heldman house played an important role in enabling the  
Hill District to pass through racial change without volatility. Staff 
from the Kaufmann Settlement stayed at Heldman and worked  
willingly with the new clientele, overcoming the settlement house’s 
segregated history and providing a “safe house” that permitted a 
radically changing community to be absorbed and welcomed without 
much tension. Caucasian merchants stayed on the Hill, too, fruitfully 
and profitably serving an African American clientele for 15 years 
until the race riots of 1968. 
 But the impulse for social reform that had typified the first gener-
ation of the settlement house movement had disappeared. Jones still 
remembered, almost 60 years later, a distinct organizational aloofness 
with regard to the development decisions that would demolish the 
lower Hill: “I think our leadership did not want to be in opposition to 
the people who were pushing change. I remember one worker being 
angry, feeling we should be much more involved and knowledgeable 
about what was going on.” Jones herself would become active in civil 
rights issues but as an individual citizen, not on the Heldman House’s 
behalf. The house did permit activist organizations such as the Hill 
District People’s Forum, a group with liberal tendencies, to meet in 
the building but did not identify ideologically with any of them. 
 One likely reason for the political aloofness was a sense of power-
lessness to affect the decisions made by civic leaders, then still almost 
all White males. Freeland’s comments about the difficulty of funding 
Heldman’s budget after Jewish philanthropy shifted elsewhere are 
illustrative: “It was hard to get money. Maybe one Negro was on the 
board of the Community Chest [the predecessor to the United Way]. 
The White community was this large protoplasm, and as I would 
swing my fist at it, trying to make progress, I would just be swallowed 
up by it. That was the story of so many efforts by Negroes in  
this community.” 
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 As a service organization, however, Heldman continued to reflect 
the distinction between settlement houses and social service centers. 
“We still had a settlement house theory,” Freeland affirmed. “People 
come and you help them at every level. They become part of your 
group, not just people to be given a service and then sent back out.” 
The multiplicity of services to people of all age groups helped to  
make Heldman and its patrons feel like an extended family rather 
than simply a service agency and a client base. 
 But times were changing. They had changed dramatically by 1965, 
when Jonathan Zimmer came to Pittsburgh as an AmeriCorps VISTA 
volunteer and was assigned to live at Heldman. “I felt fortunate to be  
in this magnificent building,” Zimmer explained. “They took me to  
the fifth floor, which was set up as a dormitory, and the whole floor 
was available. I was able to set up an apartment and live in three 
rooms. I then met Ruth Bowler [later Ruth Richardson], who was  
the executive at that time; she lived on the fourth floor with her son,  
Billy. I helped to tutor him, and he eventually graduated from an  
Ivy League school.” 
 However, the heyday of the settlement houses (which on the  
Hill included the Soho, Kay Boys’ Club, the YMCA, and Heldman)  
had passed. Pittsburgh’s Health and Welfare Planning Association, 
which heavily influenced philanthropy in the city, had already  
recommended phasing out the settlement houses in favor of govern-
ment-run recreation and service programs. Heldman merged with  
the Soho settlement house and Kay Boys’ Club to become Hill House 
Association, which tore down the beautiful Heldman building and 
replaced it with a community center. 
 “I felt bad about them tearing down a building, but it was very 
expensive to maintain,” Jones said. Zimmer, who would go on to be 
executive director of ACTION-Housing Inc., Pittsburgh’s leading  
nonprofit provider of low-income housing, for a quarter century,  
was less convinced that the demolition was necessary: 
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  All through my career, I saw decisions like that made in an  
  inappropriate way by people who didn’t really understand  
  the community. Al Johnson, a photographer on Centre Avenue,  
  fought tirelessly to renew the Heldman center and make it 
   what it had been for all those decades previously. That to me  
  would have been the right decision. You saw this community  
  that was so hard pressed, but with vitality, and this marvelous 
  building with everything that community needed. Al was right 
  and that [Health and Welfare Planning Association] planning 
  report was wrong. Perhaps it was economically unfeasible,  
  but if you really get behind an idea in Pittsburgh, you can do   
  it, and that building could still have been serving the needs  
  of the Hill. I have seen that over and over again where decisions 
  are made: When outsiders do studies and economic analysis  
  to figure out what is right for a community, they often miss  
  the boat.
Kingsley: The Races Clash
 While working at Heldman I entered the University of Pittsburgh 
master’s program in social work. My internship took me to another 
settlement house, Kingsley in East Liberty, where I remained on  
staff after graduating. In terms of race relations, my move from 
Heldman to Kingsley was like jumping from a blender into a barbecue. 
The predominantly Italian neighborhood was generally hostile to the 
arrival of African Americans, and Kingsley’s highly elite board was 
reluctant to serve them. 
 Kingsley had opened in 1893 to serve immigrants in Pittsburgh’s 
dirty, warehouse-laden Strip District. In 1900, it received a Hill District 
mansion from Henry Clay Frick, but in 1923, as the lower Hill was 
becoming increasingly African American, Kingsley sold the house and 
moved to East Liberty. Now the organization was once again seeing 
the neighborhood around it change color. Blacks represented 31 percent 
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of the surrounding population in 1950, 44 percent in 1960, and  
66 percent in 1970. From 1950 to 1970, the White population in  
the census tracts around Kingsley would fall by almost two-thirds, 
from 10,383 to 3,575. 
 Ralph Proctor, who grew up nearby, recalled that Kingsley  
“had a very bad reputation among Black people. There were stories 
about Blacks trying to use the place and being beaten up. We stayed 
away from there.” I knew Kingsley’s reputation, too. I remember 
taking a team of African American youths from Heldman to a basket-
ball game at Kingsley in the mid-1950s and warning them before the 
trip, “We have three choices. We can lose the game, win and stay for  
a fight, or win and get out of there in a hurry.” The youths chose to 
show admirable self-restraint, as they won the game and exited 
promptly thereafter. 
 But by the time I arrived at Kingsley, a courageous executive 
director named Robert Haas had persuaded his board to open up the 
organization to African Americans. Thus the same shift was now 
happening as had occurred at Heldman, though more slowly and with 
much less accommodation by local Whites. As a community organizer,  
I had the unenviable task of bringing the races together. 
 Dave Epperson, who would go on to become one of Pitt’s first 
African American deans as the head of the School of Social Work, was 
a graduate student intern at Kingsley at the time, and I was his field 
instructor. He described his experience aptly: “There were very strong 
lines of demarcation between the Italians and the African Americans. 
My job was to see if I could bring the [Italian and Black] communities 
together. It was impossible. What Moe did for me was to put me in 
situations where I could not be successful.” In spite of (or perhaps 
because of) this, we remained close friends throughout our lives. 
 We did make some progress. Kingsley’s summer camp remained 
segregated, but several African Americans joined the staff, among 
whom former Boston Celtics basketball player Chuck Cooper—the 
first African American drafted by the National Basketball Association—
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was the most prominent. His stardom and personality endeared him 
even to the Italians. But, as Epperson put it, “Do you have to be an 
NBA star to get along?” 
 Working as a community organizer at Kingsley was a very 
interesting role that prepared me extremely well for my future in city 
politics. Kingsley had become a sort of liaison between the community 
and city government, identifying local issues and funneling them to 
the people who could solve them—which, in the Democratic machine 
government of Mayor David Lawrence, meant the ward bosses. I 
spent much of my time meeting with churches, schools, and individual 
residents in the neighborhood, finding out their concerns in such 
areas as street maintenance, police patrols, and recreation. After 
achieving a general consensus of views on an issue, I would take 
these community requests to the city and county governments.  
 Where local controversies broke out, I tended to try to find  
common ground among the contesting groups. For example, a senior 
citizen public housing project on Larimer Avenue aroused the typical 
concerns about lower-income people coming into the neighborhood; 
the Italians were doubly concerned that the project might attract poor 
Blacks. Kingsley sought to give the community a stronger voice in 
project decisions, to the housing authority’s notable discomfort. 
 Kingsley steered clear of one of the neighborhood’s toughest racial 
battle: the effort to integrate swimming pools led by Black Presbyterian 
pastor LeRoy Patrick. Yet we did form an interracial committee to 
examine community issues. Epperson and I met with Patrick and 
other African American leaders in an effort to change their perception 
of Kingsley as a racially segregated place; we also visited with Italian 
church and business leaders. 
 I did not attempt to tinker with Kingsley’s participation in the 
12th Ward electoral machine. Kingsley was the voting place for  
two districts. Each election day, I saw the machine turn out voters, 
including those with disabilities who needed a ride to the polls, in 
great numbers. Some quantities of money and occasionally alcohol 
18
changed hands, after which the recipients went behind the curtain  
to vote. Anyone who spent longer in the voting booth than would  
have been necessary to pull the straight-ticket Democratic lever was  
questioned upon coming out. 
 In contrast to Heldman House’s hands-off stance, Kingsley was 
deeply involved with redevelopment planning when it came to East 
Liberty in the late 1950s. Especially after the rancor that had sur-
rounded redevelopment decisions in the Hill, planners paid careful 
attention to the 1954 federal housing law’s community participation 
requirements. Urban planners at the time had a view that city  
development should consist primarily of high-rise buildings surrounded 
by green space, and they largely ignored what local residents thought; 
the new law was forcing them to listen. We arranged block meetings 
with the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Pittsburgh staff;  
I recall Al Jacobs, more comfortable with community dialogues than 
most planners, sitting on the floor in a Buddha-like pose and listening 
to residents for hours. 
 Meanwhile, the URA contracted with Kingsley to manage commu-
nity participation in the Negley Avenue area of East Liberty, which 
was slated for restoration, not redevelopment. We took an architect 
door to door through the neighborhood, providing homeowners with 
suggestions on how they could improve their properties and offering 
help in accessing funds to those who showed interest. 
 Inside its walls, Kingsley was running an impressive array of 
cradle-to-grave programming. Along with a strong professional staff, 
Kingsley had an army of volunteers because it had become a preferred 
community service location—almost a rite of passage—for upper-income 
suburban women, who made substantial time commitments. Integration 
of Kingsley’s adolescent programs came with difficulty, but by 1961 its 
summer camp was integrated. 
 Kingsley was still humming in 1962, when graduate student Guy 
Tumolo served there as a part-time community developer. Tumolo, 
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who would go on to a long career in county government, created the 
Larimer Avenue Business Association under Kingsley’s umbrella.  
This association’s main goal, as documented in the 1963 monthly 
newsletters still in Tumolo’s files, was to restore two-way traffic on 
Larimer Avenue; the city had made it one way inbound to funnel 
traffic speedily into East Liberty, thereby inadvertently endangering 
Larimer’s businesses. (The advocacy effort was successful, and  
Larimer Avenue was two way again by July 1963.) 
 Tumolo recalled seeing lots of activities taking place at Kingsley, 
organized by recreation director Angelo Carrabba. “They all listened  
to Angie, even the street gangs,” Tumolo said. Young women and 
adults came in for sewing and cooking classes, a Pittsburgh Symphony 
Orchestra trombonist taught music lessons, and a highly skilled artist 
offered painting and design classes. Kingsley’s neighborhood council 
was still active, too, but by then it was fighting an uphill battle; as 
Tumolo noted, “Some of the new arrivals in the neighborhood were  
not as respectful of property and people as the folks on the council.” 
While Kingsley was fully integrated by then, other, more threatening 
issues had emerged: abandoned houses and drug activity. The neigh-
borhood’s vitality was under siege, and within a few years, many of  
its residents moved out. 
 Kingsley’s integration experience was intense and briefly  
successful but short lived. Like so many inner-city neighborhoods, 
the Larimer Avenue section of East Liberty did not remain racially 
balanced for long. The Italians moved on to Penn Hills and other areas, 
leaving an increasingly African American neighborhood behind them.
Decline and Revival: The Kingsley Sequel
 Kingsley’s grand building was eventually doomed by deferred 
maintenance. In the mid-1970s, with estimates of up to $1 million 
needed to bring the building up to code, the board decided to sell it. 
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As of 1978, Kingsley still operated a summer camp, but its community 
programs were gone; in fact, the organization’s office had moved to  
a medical building where children were not permitted. 
 Even though an African American, Jim Henry, had served as 
executive director after Haas, Kingsley had still not put charges of 
segregation to rest. In 1978, Proctor recalled, a White friend called 
him to say he had been offered the executive post at Kingsley. When 
Proctor tried to congratulate him, the friend interrupted to say that 
he was declining the offer, adding, “People have told me that if I bring 
my White ass out there, they are going to kick it, because Kingsley 
didn’t try to find a Black for the job and people were not going to 
stand for anyone White unless they addressed that issue.” 
 When the friend encouraged Proctor to pursue the job, his first 
reaction was: “No way; I would not want to ruin my reputation.”  
But eventually other Black friends persuaded him to apply. Their  
rationale was that an application from someone as qualified as 
Proctor would reveal whether Kingsley’s board was open to having 
an activist Black at the helm. Proctor gave a relaxed and outspoken 
interview, as he had no intention of taking the job anyhow. After a 
second interview and an attractive contract offer, he recalled, “With 
much regret and sadness, I accepted.” He would stay for 19 years. 
 According to Proctor, Kingsley’s board remained reluctant to  
become engaged with the local community again, but he found a  
creative way to acquire a facility. When the URA tried to sell a  
building in East Liberty, Proctor pleaded Kingsley’s case and talked 
the URA down from the appraised price of $165,000 to $40,000.  
Then, without disclosing the handshake agreement, he described  
the building to his board and asked for authorization to purchase  
it if the price came down to $50,000. The board agreed—and soon it 
owned a building. Kingsley would operate out of this location, restoring 
its former community presence and recreational programs, until it 
constructed its present facility in the late 1990s.
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Policy Implications of the Settlement Houses
 People today are concerned about the idea of place—about enabling 
residents to feel connected to their neighborhood or community.  
The settlement houses fulfilled this purpose wonderfully. They provided  
cradle-to-grave services that brought people from all walks of life 
through their doors. As a result, going to the settlement house was  
not a stigma; if you went there for help, you didn’t stick out.  
 Is the settlement house concept still viable today? It can be.  
The Sarah Heinz House on Pittsburgh’s North Side and the revived 
Kingsley Association in East Liberty are successfully applying a 
similar model, with a menu of community and recreational activities. 
But many factors make the task more difficult today. Technology has 
transformed interpersonal relationships; young people today are using 
Twitter or texting instead of meeting their friends at the rec center. 
The evolution of neighborhood violence from street fighting to gun 
battles, with gangs or drug dealers battling over territory and market 
share, makes it almost impossible for neighborhood centers to be safe 
houses, as Heldman and Kingsley were in the 1950s. The Hill and East 
Liberty back then certainly had underworld criminal activity, such as 
numbers games, but it was generally carried out in an orderly fashion, 
without violence. Today, we have a fragmented underworld, with  
internal competition for control of the drug trade, which often results 
in violent disputes. 
 In the Hill District of the 1950s, everyone walked to school and 
then walked to Heldman; today, greater mobility has undermined the 
neighborhood’s central role in daily life. But I remain convinced that 
programs that start working with youths at an early age and continue 
to serve them as they grow, providing compassionate adults as benevo-
lent authority figures other than parents and police, can protect these 
youths effectively from the worst elements of the street. I see the Man-
chester Youth Development Center, with its associated charter school, 
as a good example. 
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 The story of Heldman’s and Kingsley’s transitional years also points 
to an often-overlooked consequence of desegregation. When the African 
American community was congregated in certain neighborhoods, it had 
Black professionals—doctors, lawyers, journalists—living there. Sure,  
as Udin observed, there was some tension between the wealthier Blacks 
from Sugar Top and the lower-income Blacks a few blocks away, but there 
were still positive Black role models within the immediate area. Desegrega-
tion, while it moved us much closer to being an equal opportunity society, 
also caused many better-off African Americans (and members of White 
ethnic groups, too) to move to more economically homogeneous communities. 
Their relocation weakened the institutional structure of lower-income 
neighborhoods and removed many of the role models.  
 Matt Hawkins, an African American who is writing his PhD disser- 
tation at the University of Pittsburgh on this time period, has eloquently 
described how the lower-income Black community left behind in this 
shift became radicalized, taking an “oppositional stance” toward main-
stream institutions and culture—and even toward those Blacks who had 
advanced within it. Hawkins has written, “The notion that the Black 
community could benefit from Black professionals who could successfully 
navigate through mainstream institutions and services was replaced 
with suspicion that such professionals had ‘sold out’ and were ‘acting 
White.’” As a result, serious academic and professional pursuits became 
not just unpopular among some lower-income Blacks, but evidence of 
betrayal of one’s own race. That challenge persists today. 
 Thanks to desegregation, our social differences today are more class 
driven and less race driven than they were 60 years ago. But racism is 
still a viral force that permeates our society, and the young Black male 
remains particularly at risk for violence, low levels of education achieve-
ment, and unemployment. Hence the continued importance of the local 
“safe houses” that the settlements once provided: alternatives that offer 
attractive cultural and recreational options to young people while also 
encouraging them to live responsibly and get their schoolwork done.
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C H A P T E R  3
The Challenges of Neighborhood and Community Development
 I became a neighborhood organizer by accident. When I was  
working at the Anna Heldman settlement house, the Hill District  
was turned upside down by traumatic change that community members, 
especially African Americans, felt powerless to resist or affect: specifically, 
the Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) project on the Lower Hill, 
which resulted in the displacement and relocation of approximately 
1,300 families. The Heldman staff felt that we should go door to door 
and try to organize neighborhood residents so that they could address 
community problems with a stronger, more unified voice. 
 Beginning with that episode and continuing throughout my career, 
I began to see neighborhood organizations as a way to build local  
consensus, to help local residents become attached to their communities, 
and to give communities a public voice. In many cases, especially in 
the battles over urban development during the 1950s and 1960s, these 
organizations provided a means of fighting back against the power and 
insensitivity of some urban planners.  
 Over the 60 years since my first community organizing experience, 
I have sat through hundreds of neighborhood meetings. Many of them 
took place in churches, causing me to live an ecumenical life. I sat  
in bars, in living rooms, on porches, in restaurants, and in child care  
centers (squeezing into chairs built for 5-year-olds). I often was the 
only White face in all-Black meetings or the sole voice of underrepre-
sented groups’ concerns in all-White meetings. 
 My own role in neighborhood development has been as varied as 
the settings. In some groups, I was a member, friend, or active supporter; 
at other times, when I was representing the City of Pittsburgh or was 
associated with an urban development plan that the community didn’t 
like, I was seen as the antagonist and as a partner in oppression.
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 After 60 years of seeing public investments revive some communities 
and weaken others, I am still reluctant to declare myself an expert  
on what works in neighborhood development. I don’t believe that there 
is a cookie-cutter process that promises success. So much depends on 
personalities, unique circumstances, and changing cultural patterns that, 
in my opinion, it is very hard to define best practices or determine  
what can be replicated from a series of idiosyncratic events. 
 In this chapter, I highlight the insights of several colleagues  
in whose work I have had the privilege of participating and who  
I consider to be distinguished experts in their respective specialties.  
I then offer a few pertinent recollections from my consulting  
experience as an urban affairs advisor to Henry Ford II.
Engagement in East Liberty
 Urban redevelopment in the Hill District took place with little 
regard for what neighborhood residents thought. It was the product of 
a philosophy that believed in protecting downtowns by creating a buffer 
area around them, even through displacing residents against their will. 
 In contrast, when I moved to the Kingsley House in East Liberty  
in 1960, I became involved in a more collaborative situation, as  
the city actively sought to engage community members in decision  
making. We at Kingsley would organize small groups of interested  
residents, block by block, and then Al Jacobs of the Pittsburgh  
Regional Planning Association (the planning arm of the Allegheny 
Conference on Community Development) and Bob Pease of the Urban 
Redevelopment Authority (URA) of Pittsburgh would sit down with 
them to discuss plans and get community input. I prepared East  
Liberty Tribune columns for Bob Haas, Kingsley’s executive director,  
on what neighborhood development meant and why residents should 
get involved with the process. 
 Racial tensions emanating from the arrival of African Americans  
in a formerly Italian neighborhood made my work more difficult.  
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But, on the other hand, the federal Housing Act of 1954 made my work 
easier, because it changed the nature of urban renewal planning and 
investment. Now, instead of just tearing down and replacing run-down 
structures, the federal government also was supporting two other 
alternatives: rehabilitation and preservation. Thus, for every property 
within the East Liberty development zone, there were now three options. 
In addition, one portion of the housing act (known as Point 7) required 
community-based citizen participation in urban renewal planning.  
 In part to fulfill this citizen participation requirement and to  
educate local residents about their options, the URA awarded Kingsley 
a contract to work directly with local homeowners. An architect and 
I went to community meetings and told residents about the funding 
and architectural services that would be available to them if they 
wanted to improve their homes. 
 Shortly thereafter, the URA offered me a full-time position.  
But I wanted to become involved in a more comprehensive approach 
to regional development rather than focusing purely on the renewal 
and redevelopment of physical structures. So, instead, I joined the 
city planning department, which was seeking to develop a long-term 
strategic vision for Pittsburgh’s neighborhoods by analyzing demo-
graphics and migration patterns. My primary task was to expand 
community participation in this process of identifying how the city 
would help to shape the future of each neighborhood and build a 
“safety net” (or relocation program) for displaced persons. 
 Traditionally, the Democratic Party ward chairs had been  
the liaisons between neighborhoods and the mayor’s office; now,  
nonpartisan organizations were competing for that function. Much  
of a big-city mayor’s political strength relies on citizens’ belief that  
their city is run well—which generally means that their garbage  
is picked up, their streets are paved, the police are responsive,  
and traffic moves efficiently. 
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Confrontation or Collaboration?
 I have already mentioned that sometimes the best way to unify 
a community is by identifying a common enemy. Confrontation was 
certainly the core of the organizing style of Saul Alinsky, a nationally 
known Chicago organizer who authored the book Rules for Radicals; 
he mobilized people by getting them mad at the establishment. That 
approach can work very well if you have a specific, short-term advocacy 
goal, such as preventing a building project or getting better garbage 
pickup in your neighborhood. It is less effective, however, if your 
goals require creating healthy collaborative relationships—say, with 
the banks that provide loans to business startups or with government 
agencies offering redevelopment grants. 
 I always saw myself as a link between a local neighborhood’s  
demands and the resources available to that community in government 
or the business community. Alinsky would have called me a sellout, 
not an organizer. He would not have chosen the path of friendly  
collaboration with sources of power, because he knew that opposing 
the powerful is difficult when you need their money. In contrast,  
I always felt it was better not to start a fight if you could get the  
resources you needed without fighting. 
 Ironically, considering that neighborhood organizing in Pittsburgh 
generally adopted a more dialogue-oriented style than Alinsky’s  
approach in Chicago, the man who became “Mr. Community Organizing” 
in Pittsburgh came from Chicago: Jim Cunningham, who would later 
become one of my most treasured colleagues at Pitt’s School of  
Social Work. 
 Cunningham began his organizing career in 1951 with Indepen-
dent Voters of Illinois (IVI), a nonprofit organization formed to give 
neighborhood entities a stronger voice in political decision making in 
Chicago and its suburbs. After five years in that position, he became 
the executive at an IVI member organization, the Hyde Park-Kenwood 
Community Conference, on Chicago’s South Side.
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 There, he directly confronted Alinsky as the city’s biggest urban 
renewal plan unfolded in Hyde Park. Cunningham felt that the 
expensive apartments proposed for Hyde Park would strengthen  
the neighborhood; Alinsky attacked him for abandoning the poor, 
arguing that the influx of high-rent properties would have a gentrifying 
effect and would displace lower-income residents. Eventually, the war-
ring parties reached a compromise that included the construction of 
new public housing in Hyde Park to balance the anticipated impact  
of the upscale residences. Despite the clash, Cunningham was an  
admirer as well as a critic of Alinsky’s work and would speak favorably 
of it in his first book, The Resurgent Neighborhood (1965). 
 In 1959 Cunningham was offered a community organizer position 
with ACTION-Housing, Inc., in Pittsburgh. “I had eight children and 
I needed more money,” Cunningham recalled, “but my main reason 
for leaving Chicago at that time was that IVI had challenged the 
mayor [Richard J. Daley, who won his second term in 1959] and lost, 
and so I felt my future in Chicago was not very bright.” 
 Cunningham pioneered the grassroots mobilization of neighbor-
hoods in Pittsburgh, using ACTION-Housing’s connections with the 
Ford Foundation to get grant money for organizing work in struggling 
communities within the city. He summarized his philosophy in a  
2011 interview:
 It was a version of the old democratic idea of America—that if  
 people would unite in their own little area, they would be powerful   
 in obtaining resources from government and foundations. I viewed  
 America as a society where business was overly exerting power,  
 and I felt that if you had powerful collections of neighborhood  
 organizations—people who had reasons to take good care of  
 their homes, raise their families there, and be stable rather than  
 moving around all the time—this could be one of the good counter- 
 forces to business. Collectively, people could do a lot on their own  
 in these small groups.
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 Cunningham was responsible for persuading the Ford Foundation 
to choose Pittsburgh as one of its six “Gray Area” program cities.  
The foundation supported the establishment of community action 
organizations in three Pittsburgh neighborhoods: Hazelwood, Home-
wood, and Perry Hilltop. (I still remember the two dog bites I suffered 
while helping to build community participation in these communities.) 
These Ford Foundation efforts were a precursor of the community  
action provisions contained in the centerpiece of the Great Society 
war on urban poverty, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (which 
will be discussed in the next chapter). At a time when city planners 
across the United States were trying to tear down traditional neigh-
borhoods and rebuild them to look like suburbs, Cunningham promoted 
the view that neighborhoods themselves should be able to determine 
how they will function without fear of being undercut by large- 
scale forces.
Successes and Bruises
 Some of Pittsburgh’s most vibrant neighborhoods today were 
shaped by the neighborhood organizing activity of the 1960s.  
On Pittsburgh’s North Side, the URA wanted to tear down aging 
homes in the Manchester neighborhood and replace them with  
suburban-style housing or public housing communities. The Manchester 
Community Council fought back by teaming with historic preservation 
advocates and convinced the URA to fund restoration rather than 
razing. Ultimately, the community achieved recognition of the  
Manchester Historic District, the only such designation in a lower- 
income section of Pittsburgh, and thereby protected not only hundreds 
of examples of classic architecture but also the community’s sense  
of place. 
 Since then, other neighborhood organizations have had significant 
successes. The South Side has transformed land once occupied by 
steel mills into attractive middle-class housing and retail areas;  
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in fact, the plethora of trendy bars drawing revelers to Carson Street 
each weekend suggests that perhaps South Side revitalization has 
been too successful. More recently, communities like Bloomfield, 
Lawrenceville, Friendship, and Greenfield have been shifting toward 
a younger demographic thanks to local initiatives in housing upkeep 
and the influx of a diverse variety of retail businesses. In these  
communities and others, the unpredictable nature of cultural dynamics 
is finally starting to turn in favor of urban renewal. In the auto-crazed 
1950s, the American dream was a spacious suburban home with a 
two-car garage; now, more modest footprints, cultural diversity,  
and closeness to downtown are “in.” Would any of this have been 
possible without the never-give-up efforts of community organization 
leaders during 50 years of slow, gradual, but seemingly irreversible 
urban decline? 
 Some of the most feisty local activism of the 1960s took place in 
Oakland, a neighborhood dominated by the University of Pittsburgh 
and several major hospitals. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
Pitt, Carlow College, and the hospitals were purchasing surrounding 
properties to accommodate expansion, causing considerable community 
disruption and animosity. 
 Sandra Phillips, now executive director of Peoples Oakland in 
Pittsburgh and then a student in urban planning at Pitt’s Graduate 
School of Public and International Affairs, also was a student in my 
community organization class. She became deeply involved in these 
battles, helping to mobilize the Oakland community to push back 
against these large institutions. In one of the biggest fights, citizens 
mobilized to fight a Pitt master plan that would have put five new 
University buildings in the vicinity of Forbes Field, the Pittsburgh 
Pirates’ home until Three Rivers Stadium opened in 1970. “They put 
together a plan to buy up Oakland [Avenue] and [South] Bouquet 
Street,” Phillips said, “and were scaring people by saying the state 
would take their houses away [if the residents didn’t sell the homes 
to the University]. We lost the fight to save Forbes Field, but we 
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blocked three of the five buildings.” (The two that gained approval are 
now Pitt’s law school building and Wesley W. Posvar Hall; the latter 
building still displays Forbes Field’s home plate at its time-honored 
location, under glass, as a reminder of what once stood there.) 
 The community also banded together to oppose a 1,700-car  
garage proposed by the University Health System (now known as 
the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center or UPMC) for the corner 
of Terrace and Darragh streets. “Early on, I learned that you could 
kill a big development with technicalities,” Phillips observed. In this 
case, the main technicality was that part of the parcel was zoned as 
residential; in addition, community advocates presented data project-
ing severe traffic congestion if the garage was built. Pittsburgh City 
Council rejected the zoning change by an 8–1 vote. Similarly, a Pitt 
proposal to build a dormitory on the site of the Fanny Edel Falk  
Laboratory School was defeated due to zoning objections. 
 “We loved beating the institutions because they were so aggressive,” 
Phillips explained. “We were well organized and they didn’t like that 
at all. We would never be equals, but we could level the playing field 
with a base of popular support so that we could have a conversation. 
Out of this bruising set of fights came a recognition that we should set 
up a forum representing Oakland as a whole and get the institutions 
to look out for what was best for all of us.” 
 Having found that they could not beat Oakland citizens consis-
tently in the political arena, the institutions came to the bargaining 
table and joined in forming Oakland Directions, Inc. David Bergholz 
of the Allegheny Conference, Phillips, and I recommended rules of 
engagement for a hybrid organization that would balance the needs  
of the residents and the institutions. The bylaws of this nonprofit  
umbrella organization stipulated that community groups would hold 
half of the board seats, while representatives of Oakland’s universities 
and hospitals, other commercial interests, the City of Pittsburgh, the 
city parking authority, and the Port Authority of Allegheny County 
transit service would occupy the others. The years of hostility between 
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big institutions and neighborhood interests had sparked energetic 
local participation; Phillips recalled that 25 separate block clubs were 
functioning in Oakland during the 1970s, feeding information into  
the planning process. 
 Oakland Directions sponsored a community-wide process in 
1977–79 that established clear boundaries separating residential, 
retail, and institutional land uses, with mutual agreement that these 
boundaries would not be violated. The Oakland Planning and Devel-
opment Corporation (OPDC) was established in 1980 to oversee future 
community planning decisions and carry out strategic real estate 
development; Phillips would serve as OPDC’s executive director for 
its first 10 years.
Heinz’s Big Investment
 The 1980s were the heyday of development activities in Pittsburgh, 
and H.J. “Jack” Heinz II was at the center of them. Henry S. “Hank” 
Beukema, now executive director of the McCune Foundation, was a 
Heinz Endowments program officer at that time and recalls his boss’ 
strategic role. 
 Heinz’s interest in community development began with the 
renovation of a declining theater into Heinz Hall, home of the Pitts-
burgh Symphony Orchestra. During that endeavor, he became deeply 
concerned about the deteriorating, seedy blocks on Penn and Liberty 
Avenues nearby. “There were people on the street at night,” Beukema 
recalled, “but not the kind who would be coming into Heinz Hall.” 
 In 1976, Heinz formed 601 Liberty Inc. for the express purpose  
of buying up downtown property. Three years later, he and the  
Allegheny Conference on Community Development funded a study  
of the Penn-Liberty corridor that established the blueprint for further 
investments. In 1984, Heinz’s discussions with Pittsburgh Mayor 
Richard Caliguiri led to the formation of the Pittsburgh Cultural 
Trust, which over the subsequent quarter century transformed  
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a red-light district into the attractive Cultural District, with six  
performance venues, galleries, public art, and numerous restaurants. 
 These efforts to remake downtown sparked a broader interest in 
neighborhood development. In fall 1980, Heinz asked his foundation 
staff to spend the next six months creating a neighborhood develop-
ment strategy. According to Beukema, Heinz’s instruction was “not  
to develop the program ourselves but to talk to people who knew  
what they were doing already and then come back with a proposal.” 
 Beukema consulted with a group of people involved in neighbor-
hoods (myself included) and, with Heinz’s blessing, began offering 
grants to Pittsburgh community development corporations. The 
initial recipients, christened the “Fortunate Five” by a Pittsburgh 
newspaper reporter, included two mentioned previously in this chapter 
(Manchester Community Council and OPDC) plus the North Side  
Civic Development Corporation, East Liberty Development Inc.,  
and Homewood-Brushton Regional Development Corporation.
Real Challenges in Real Estate
 Neighborhood development requires a much broader range  
of expertise than community organizing. A community organizer  
brings people together, builds consensus, and engages in advocacy;  
a neighborhood organization seeks solutions to complex problems  
like economic revitalization, housing, and health care. The task  
of these community organizations became even more complex as  
the Ford Foundation, which provided grants to each of the Fortunate  
Five groups in Pittsburgh, encouraged them not just to assist with 
other entities’ development activities but to become owners and  
developers of real estate themselves. 
 These demands led to the formation of the first intermediary 
designed to help Pittsburgh’s neighborhood organizations do their job: 
the Community Technical Assistance Center (CTAC), which I served 
as its first board chair. CTAC’s first executive director, David Feehan, 
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had come to McKeesport as an AmeriCorps VISTA-funded community 
organizer in 1968, helping public housing tenants to fight racial  
discrimination and advocating for reform in the city’s district court. 
He moved on to Minneapolis, directing a Model Cities program there 
and later providing consulting and communication assistance for 
a dozen Model Cities locations around the country. After Feehan 
returned to Pittsburgh for graduate study, Bergholz of the Allegheny 
Conference recruited him to organize a similar technical assistance 
program here, which became established as CTAC in 1980. Feehan 
and I both believe that some of the new community development  
corporations (or CDCs) formed around this time would never have 
gotten off the ground without CTAC’s support. 
 One of CTAC’s fledgling clients was East Liberty Development 
Inc. (ELDI), which persuaded Feehan to become its executive director 
in 1982. East Liberty offers a particularly interesting case study of 
nonprofit neighborhood development organizations’ efforts to follow 
the Ford Foundation mandate and become directly involved in real 
estate management.  
 East Liberty today is another resurgent community, featuring  
a Home Depot where a Sears once was, a Target on Penn Avenue,  
and the upscale Bakery Square development full of high-tech tenants 
like Google. In 1982, it was not so attractive. East Liberty’s core  
business district was already losing market share in the mid-1960s, 
when the URA tried to save it by turning Penn Avenue into a pedes-
trian mall surrounded by a ring road and parking lots. By the time 
the project was completed, many small shops had closed or been  
demolished, East Liberty had a reputation as a high-poverty area, 
and the remaining businesses were on life support. 
 Feehan recalled that, when first offered the ELDI job by board 
chair and Mellon Bank manager David Thomas, “I was a bit reticent 
because, as I said to him, I didn’t know much about real estate.  
He said I would learn.” Feehan and his board both felt that it would 
be more efficient for community organizations like ELDI to focus 
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on recruiting businesses than on actually buying and rehabilitating 
buildings, but they submitted to the Ford Foundation’s preference. 
 ELDI’s first purchase of real estate was a vacant 14,000-square-
foot building, formerly a low-budget hotel. “It didn’t look like a  
difficult project,” Feehan said. “We had people take a preliminary  
look and they said that, except for the floors not being level, it 
wouldn’t be too difficult.” As it turned out, rehabilitation took more 
than two years.  
 ELDI then set its sights on an eyesore-filled block across the 
street from the majestic East Liberty Presbyterian Church. The 
owners were offering several buildings for $1.5 million; Feehan was 
overjoyed to negotiate them down to a $770,000 sale price but soon 
found that he had not gotten such a great bargain:
 We hadn’t owned the buildings more than a few months when  
 I got a call at 3 a.m. on a Sunday from the fire department,  
 saying that the sprinkler system had gone off in one of them.  
 There was no fire, but the roof had so many leaks that water  
 had gotten into the fourth-floor ceiling and rotted out the plaster,  
 which had collapsed and brought down the sprinkler system  
 with it. By Monday morning, we had chunks of plaster smashing  
 onto people’s desks at the welfare department offices on the first  
 floor. The staff couldn’t get in, and their offices were soaked.  
 By 11 that morning, they were picketing ELDI’s office and calling 
 us slumlords.
 ELDI also tried to create the approximate equivalent of an outlet 
mall in East Liberty. It couldn’t attract the standard factory outlets 
because of competition from nearby department stores, but a consultant 
thought there could be a market for secondhand and discontinued 
housewares. ELDI got loans from the state and from Mellon Bank  
and opened a glass, crystal, and china resale shop, hiring welfare  
recipients to work under an experienced retail manager. “We did well 
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for a few months,” Feehan said, “and then found that many of the 
people who bought things were doing so out of their social conscience. 
Once that group was exhausted, we did not do as well. The store lasted 
for a little over a year and ran out of cash. Fortunately the state  
loan was forgivable, but Mellon’s was not. The lessons learned were 
valuable—and expensive.” 
 Despite those early difficulties, ELDI persevered. It rehabilitated  
the block across from the East Liberty Presbyterian Church in 
conjunction with a real estate consulting firm from Philadelphia, 
and preserved the last of East Liberty’s classic theaters, the Regent 
Theatre (constructed in 1914 and now known as the Kelly Strayhorn 
Theater). Finding that major commercial real-estate brokers were 
too busy making money in the suburbs to spend time in East Liberty, 
Feehan and one of his staff members got their own brokerage licenses 
and formed a for-profit partnership with a small real-estate firm, 
bringing more than a dozen tenants into the neighborhood. ELDI  
also repopulated the largely vacant Penn Avenue South corridor  
with small shops.
The Pittsburgh Partnership
 A second community development intermediary alongside CTAC 
was born in 1989. At this time, the Heinz Endowments and Mellon 
Bank Foundation were heavily invested in supporting the Fortunate 
Five plus CDCs in Pittsburgh’s South Side and Hill District. After 
meeting with a Ford Foundation program manager who was interested 
in funding intermediary organizations, Beukema brought together 
Bergholz, Paul Brophy of the URA, and me to develop a proposal. 
 Beukema was receptive to the idea for personal reasons as well. 
Up to this point, while the Allegheny Conference had participated  
in proposal review and served as a pass-through for funds, Beukema  
and his grant-making colleagues had sought to remain directly 
involved with the neighborhood organizations, but their availability 
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was becoming stretched too thin. With the Ford Foundation’s backing 
and additional support from the Heinz Endowments, Mellon Bank 
Foundation, and Pittsburgh National Bank, the Pittsburgh Partnership 
for Neighborhood Development (PPND) came into existence and hired 
OPDC’s Sandra Phillips as its first director. 
 The idea behind PPND, Beukema stated, was that “we could do 
more collectively than by our individual grant programs, so we basically 
wholesaled our resources to the intermediary and let it be the retailer.”
 Phillips shared some recollections from her time at PPND:
 We had a strong board of powerful people who represented  
 the four legs of the table: business, banking, foundations,  
 and community [including government]. We did real estate and  
 we funded community organizations. We decided not to have  
 the community organizations on the PPND board because of the  
 conflict of interest. We tried to be the first money in (for planning  
 and site development) and the last in, filling the gap to make  
 the project go. We also put money into the first Crawford-Roberts  
 apartments [in the Hill District] and into housing on the North Side.
 Things were not always peaceful. I found out that a couple of  
 the community organizations were really screwing up with  
 their money. We ended up setting up a formal workout program  
 with audits and helping them pay back taxes.
 In retrospect, Beukema described the effort as moderately  
successful, as PPND built community consensus behind projects  
and attracted like-minded investors to pool their resources. The  
intermediary provided administrative support to CDCs as well as 
some technical assistance. “We knew we did not have enough money  
to arrest deterioration and disinvestment totally,” Beukema said, 
“but we attempted to pick signature projects that would show investors 
that they could make money here.” Some of the projects had to be 
37
refinanced when projected growth in property values failed to materi-
alize. On the other hand, some investments have had lasting impact, 
such as the revitalization and spin-off impact that resulted from helping 
Home Depot to occupy the former Sears site in East Liberty. 
 Beukema compared PPND’s longer-term experience to timber 
harvesting: “The second-growth forest is not always as good.” Succes-
sion issues arose as CDC directors and foundation staff left and city 
administrations changed. “If I were to create an intermediary today,” 
he observed, “I would probably put a sunset provision on it, because 
often the external environment changes so much that just making 
incremental adjustments to the organization doesn’t get you where 
you need to be.”
We Have to Get Along
 I always viewed my community involvement as complementary 
to my university teaching role, and I served on numerous nonprofit 
boards. As vice president of ACTION-Housing, I had ample opportunity 
to observe how internal division within a community’s leadership  
can sabotage progress. I also had the pleasure of working with  
Jonathan Zimmer, and then later Larry Swanson, who has served  
on ACTION-Housing’s staff for more than 25 years and as its  
executive director since 2005. 
 ACTION-Housing wants to spend its energy creating high-quality 
affordable housing, not engaging in local political battles. So it tends 
to invest its resources where it can find a strong, respected local  
partner who will not be undermined by opposition. As a positive  
example of such an entity, Swanson pointed to the Bloomfield-Garfield 
Corporation (BGC), which partnered with ACTION-Housing to turn 
a former Catholic school building into senior housing with a health 
center on the ground floor. “BGC is one of the most stable CDCs  
in Pittsburgh,” Swanson said. “They understand the needs and the 
market in their community—in this case, they understood the need 
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for independent living for elderly people whose older homes were  
falling apart. They used their community connections to mobilize  
public support, which helped to get approval from the city and URA.” 
 On the other hand, there is Braddock, one of Allegheny County’s 
most forlorn municipalities, where ACTION-Housing inherited several 
properties. “There have always been multiple dueling organizations 
there,” Swanson said. “When one organization proposes something, 
the other one opposes it, and a fight for resources begins. This is the 
dynamic that destroys communities. Braddock does not have a strong 
community organization that is truly well grounded in the community.” 
 In between those two extremes is Homewood, where ACTION- 
Housing navigated community conflict to complete a senior housing 
project. “The local conflicts consumed so much energy,” Swanson stated. 
“I am willing to take on conflict in order to serve what I consider  
a critical need, such as housing for people who are HIV positive.  
But being wedged between two community groups is not my fight.” 
 Swanson identified several key factors in building unified  
community support. Sometimes time is the only healer—the feuding 
parties need time to realize that, if they continue fighting, they and 
their community will lose. Sometimes a respected leader can bridge 
the gap, as Swanson saw city council member and school board  
president Jake Milliones do in the Hill District. For would-be  
developers, transparency, full disclosure of plans, and willingness  
to work with public officials are essential. And a credible legal threat— 
such as when the proposed development is clearly permitted under 
existing zoning—helps, too. “It’s magical how the risk of being sued 
provides local officials with a good excuse to vote for something,” 
Swanson laughed. 
 Ellen Kight, who was regional director of the Pennsylvania  
Department of Community and Economic Development (formerly  
the Department of Community Affairs) for more than 20 years, noted 
the frequency of turf battles between elected officials and community 
organizations. “We tried to invest in both groups and bring them  
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together,” Kight said of her work in directing state funding.  
“Local government officials felt they were challenged [by the CDCs], 
that it was an adversarial relationship. Today, some of that feeling 
is still there, but it has largely gone away.” Kight found that young, 
idealistic community activists sometimes fostered the conflict by  
not understanding local government processes and making  
unrealistic demands. 
 Kight’s experience at the Department of Community and Economic 
Development showed, she said, that strong community engagement 
and a clear community-wide plan are essential for success. “We’d be 
approached by three or four different groups in a municipality, with 
no agreement as to what the top priorities were,” she said. “They were 
duplicating efforts and had not thought strategically. Once we were 
able to incentivize local cooperation, we could then invest in projects 
that would make a difference in the community.” 
 Such cooperation also is crucial, Kight said, because effective 
community development must be relatively comprehensive; one com-
munity need, such as better housing, can seldom be resolved without 
addressing interrelated issues like health services, public safety,  
and business development.
Henry Ford II’s Good Intentions
 In the late 1960s Henry Ford II was looking for outside advice  
on how he, as one of America’s most prominent business leaders, 
could make a difference in Detroit and other troubled cities. He 
figured that, because Pittsburgh had remained a relatively safe city 
while Detroit was ravaged by race riots, maybe someone from Pitts-
burgh could help Detroit. Michael Svirdoff, a Ford Foundation vice 
president, contacted Cunningham, who had joined the University  
of Pittsburgh School of Social Work, where I was teaching part time. 
Cunningham said that he was too busy to add an ongoing consulting 
responsibility but recommended that Ford hire me. As a result, for 
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several years, I traveled to Detroit once a week. One of my roles 
was to offer suggestions on how Ford could support New Detroit, an 
organization formed to develop unified responses to the city’s problems. 
I don’t know how much I influenced Ford’s decisions, but Booton 
Herndon’s 1969 biography of the Ford family, Ford: An Unconventional 
Biography of the Men and Their Times, reported the following on  
my role:
 To get some idea of how to deal with [the New Detroit Committee],  
 Ford asked the advice of an expert. “I’ve been called in by a lot  
 of industrialists,” Morton Coleman of Pittsburgh, an unusual  
 combination of idealistic social worker and practical politician,  
 told me, “but I found Ford a new breed. Most people have  
 skimmed through a report or two and talked with somebody  
 a little bit, but Ford had read all the reports and was thoroughly  
 familiar with the situation. For the first time I could skip my  
 preliminary lecture and start even. I was a little wary of this  
 great industrialist at first, but in a couple of minutes he  
 demonstrated a frankness and honesty which put me at ease.  
 No pomposity, no sham. In working with Ford I’ve found that  
 he studies the issues thoroughly, becomes knowledgeable, then  
 acts quickly, decisively, almost impulsively. This man is providing  
 leadership for Detroit.” 1
 Although I think my role in Ford’s decision processes was marginal 
at best, it is possible that I indirectly influenced the construction of 
Detroit’s best-known landmark, the Renaissance Center. The story  
of this building begins in Dearborn, where Ford’s impact illustrated 
the unintended costs that sometimes come with good intentions. 
 When Ford’s grandfather built Ford Motor Company’s world 
headquarters in Dearborn in the mid-1920s, he bought 2,300 acres 
of land around the headquarters as a buffer. The property, which 
became known as Fairlane, was probably the largest contiguous,  
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privately owned piece of urban real estate in the nation. In 1969,  
the company created Ford Motor Land Development Corporation 
(now Ford Land) for the purpose of developing this property. 
 Bill Schoen, manager of urban affairs at Ford Motor Company, 
and I proposed that Ford develop Fairlane as James Rouse was  
developing Columbia, Md.—as a planned community that could  
intelligently link its commercial, industrial, and residential areas.  
We envisioned building a racially integrated community that  
could become a model for America while also delivering profits for  
the company. 
 This vision, however, faced many obstacles, one of which was 
Orville Hubbard. Hubbard, Dearborn’s mayor since 1942, was an 
outspoken segregationist and ran the city of 90,000 people in  
such a way as to keep Blacks out; when he left office in 1978, only 
about 20 African Americans lived there. As a result, the Ford Motor  
Land Development Corporation decided that establishing a mixed 
residential community in Fairlane was impractical. Instead, it  
proceeded to pursue maximum economic return by constructing  
office buildings, a grand shopping center, luxury condominiums, and 
a light industry park. This enticed numerous Detroit businesses to 
relocate to Fairlane, thereby contributing further to the city’s decline. 
 Because Fairlane’s impact seemed incompatible with Henry Ford 
II’s commitment to rebuilding urban centers—especially Detroit—
Schoen and I argued that it was important for Ford Motor to make 
a commitment to downtown Detroit. In 1971, Ford and a group of 
Detroit financiers and business professionals commissioned a study 
through Detroit Renaissance, a nonprofit revitalization entity.  
According to Joe T. Darden, Richard Child Hill, June Thomas,  
and Richard Thomas’ book Detroit: Race and Uneven Development, 
Ford and his colleagues envisioned “a Detroit answer to Chicago’s 
waterfront.” Their search for a project of huge significance to change 
the image of downtown Detroit and counter the attractiveness of  
suburban developments like Fairlane resulted in the Ford Motor 
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Land Development Corporation purchasing 50 acres of downtown 
property, on which the Renaissance Center—an interconnected set  
of seven skyscrapers, including the tallest hotel-only building in  
the world at that time—would be built. 
 As principal architect Ford hired John Portman, known for “city 
within a city” total-living environments like the Peachtree Center in 
Atlanta and the Embarcadero Center in San Francisco. His execution 
of the project effectively walled off the Renaissance Center from the 
rest of Detroit, limiting its spillover impact on the surrounding area. 
In terms of economic activity, its initial big splash faded into unsatis-
factory performance. Constructed at a cost of about $500 million,  
the center was sold to General Motors in 1996 for just $76 million.
Neighborhood Advocacy Today
 Nowadays, we are more likely to communicate (by e-mail or  
Facebook) with someone across the globe who shares our professional 
or leisure interests than with our neighbor across the fence. Is neigh-
borhood-based advocacy still relevant? 
 I think so. While in some aspects of contemporary society (notably, 
the prevalence of online shopping and big-box retailers) efficiency has 
long trumped local intimacy and personal connection, in many other 
areas—crime prevention, transportation infrastructure, accessible 
health care, housing, parks and recreation—our interests and those  
of the people living immediately around us substantially coincide. 
Thus, compelling reasons remain for organizing communities,  
on a geographic basis, to speak with one voice, especially (as Jim  
Cunningham noted) when the community could be impacted by  
other, politically influential forces. 
 As James Madison established in the Federalist Papers, power 
unchecked becomes tyranny. Representative democracy works  
only when everyone concerned about a decision is represented.  
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Neighborhood organizing is all about giving a voice to people who 
otherwise might not have a seat at the table. 
 Community members themselves often fail to recognize the  
importance of this voice. During the Model Cities years, neighborhoods 
were entitled to elect their own representatives to local boards that 
would make development decisions; turnout for these elections was 
typically around 4 percent. But giving neighborhoods a voice is 
important because of the long-term impact on citizen attitudes and 
community cohesion—just ask the people who did not have a voice 
when the Hill District was dismantled in the late 1950s. 
 While the importance of a neighborhood voice is generally  
acknowledged, I don’t think we know how to maximize meaningful 
representation of a neighborhood. We tried the elective process in 
Model Cities, and there wasn’t enough interest to make it legitimate. 
Only in a time of community crisis do enough people care about  
decisions to outweigh the other demands that affect their lives. 
 Sometimes a respected organization can emerge as the de facto 
spokesperson for a community. But in modest communities with few 
pathways to status or power, offer a position with some significance 
and there is likely to be ongoing competition. Even in Bloomfield, 
where Swanson and others have respected the work of the Bloomfield- 
Garfield Corporation, there is an alternative community group. 
 Because leaders of neighborhood organizations are not formally 
elected, it often is hard to define who they represent or to whom they 
are accountable. Renters, whose interests may be very different from 
those of property owners, tend not to have a voice in such organizations. 
But town meetings are seldom well attended, and making decisions 
by community referendum would be chaotic. Given the alternatives 
available, neighborhood organizations appear to remain the best 
tool to hold communities together and give all citizens a chance to be 
heard on local matters. Whether we look at community organizing 
primarily as a means of bringing disparate groups together for the 
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common good (as Mike Eichler, whose work is referenced in the next 
chapter, has done) or as a way to confront power (as Alinsky did), 
neighborhood organizations remain potentially valuable as mediating 
institutions that connect the average citizen with the allocation of 
public and private resources.
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People gather in honor of the 23rd Anniversary of the Irene Kaufmann Settlement in January 
1918. The building is decorated with flags of the allies.  
46
Women and children on the steps of the Irene Kaufmann Settlement in 1919.
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Pictured in 1935, Anna Heldman, the director of the personal services department for the 
Irene Kaufmann Settlement, initiated numerous health programs that eventually became city 
services, including a visiting nurses service, a prenatal nursing service, Better Baby clinics, 
and the medical inspections in Pittsburgh’s schools.
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A children’s class in painting, one of the many diversions offered at the Irene Kaufmann center, 
in a 1950 photo by Esther Bubley.
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A 1960s-era photo of a young woman applying glaze to her clay sculpture while her instructor 
looks on at the Kingsley Association.
A 1960s-era photo of a line of girls practicing a dance routine beneath the basketball hoop 
at the Kingsley Association.
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Looking west on Fifth Avenue at Diamond Street in 1956. The reconstruction of the Lower  
Hill began in 1955 with $17 million in federal grants. This project encompassed 100 acres, 
1,300 buildings, 413 businesses, and 8,000 residents (a majority of them African-Americans), 
who were displaced in an attempt to extend the revitalization of the adjacent Golden Triangle.
Looking east on Wylie Avenue from 
Logan Street in 1956. During the  
20th century the older ethnic and  
Jewish population moved away  
and the Hill District became known  
as the Harlem of Pittsburgh, a place 
where the best jazz could be heard. 
Urban renewal in the 1950s removed 
virtually all of the Lower Hill.
Policewoman directs traffic for school children  
at Watt Street and Bedford Avenue in 1951.
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Buildings being razed in the Lower Hill District as part of Pittsburgh’s renaissance and urban 
renewal programs, January 2, 1957. 
Buildings being torn down in the Lower Hill District as part of Pittsburgh’s renaissance and 
urban renewal programs. The city skyline is visible in the background. January 2, 1957.
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Members of a musical group sponsored by the Kingsley House, ca. 1950 –60.
Kingsley League Baseball Team with Pie Treynor in 1954. As of July 23, 1954, they had 
seven wins and no losses. The photo is credited to a “Miss Chips.” 
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Chester White, Milan Burry, Marion Giesey, Mrs. Allen, and Robert S. Haas posing on the 
occassion of the Kingsley Association’s 75th year in operation in 1968.
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The enormity of the crowd and the police presence is clearly visible in this view on April 7, 
1968, during the march on the MLK Jr. National Day of Mourning. Among the throng is  
Nick Flourney, who can be seen in the middle of the crowd, facing the camera.
Marchers are flanked by police officers as they pass Washington Plaza on Centre Avenue, 
making their way to Downtown and the Point on April 7, 1968, during the march on the  
MLK Jr. National Day of Mourning.
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People stand near Washington Plaza watching the armed police officers form a barricade 
across Centre Avenue on April 7, 1968, during the march on the MLK Jr. National Day  
of Mourning.
A helicopter makes its descent near the Civic Arena as it returns from monitoring the actions 
taking place three days after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King Jr.
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An April 15, 1968, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette editorial cartoon by Cy Hungerford, illustrating 
discontent with Pittsburgh Public Safety Director David Craig and fears about continued 
racial unrest.
57
Moe Coleman in the early 1970s.
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An weathered copy of an April 25, 1999, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette Sunday  
Magazine section cover story on Moe Coleman and the depth and breadth  
of his Pittsburgh connections. 
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Marie Hamblett, deputy director, finance, for the Institute of Politics; Kathy McCauley, 
independent consultant and frequent contributor to Institute; and Moe Coleman on the 
Institute’s regional bus tour, 1999.
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Moe Coleman at the 2006 retreat where he received the Institute’s inaugural Coleman Award  
for civic leadership, pictured with his wife, Greta, and then Pitt Chancellor Mark A. Nordenberg. 
Moe Coleman; Kevin Jenkins, vice president, public policy and civic leadership, The Pittsburgh  
Foundation; and Gerri Kay, former member of the Institute’s Board of Fellows, at the 2008  
Elected Officials Retreat.
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Moe Coleman at the 2011 Elected Officials Retreat.
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Moe Coleman and Institute of Politics Director Terry Miller at the December 2013 event 
launching the Institute’s publication A Master Legislator at Work: H. John Heinz III and the 
U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging, at the Senator John Heinz History Center.
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Moe Coleman at Institute of Politics events.
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Moe Coleman in 2014.
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C H A P T E R  4
At the Center of ’60s Strife: My Years in Government
 Through the 1950s, I was primarily a neighborhood organizer; 
during the 1960s, I moved, rather unintentionally, into Pittsburgh 
city government. It all started when I became captivated by  
John F. Kennedy. 
 Although my interest in political campaigns dated back to high 
school, I was simply an opinionated nonparticipant until 1960, when 
Kennedy’s presidential candidacy motivated me to become an active 
campaigner for the first time. I find it hard to articulate, more than 
50 years later, what attracted me to campaign for him. I was not 
strongly committed to his political views, but I felt a strong personal 
identification with his youthful image, his style, and his presence.  
He represented generational change, the young men of the World  
War II era rising to power. 
 My friend Gerson Green and I coordinated Kennedy campaign 
activities for Pittsburgh’s 14th Ward (Squirrel Hill). In most wards 
at that time, the Democratic Party apparatus coordinated campaign 
work through the ward chair, but a few independent Democratic  
clubs with the capacity to mobilize their own volunteers ran their own 
operations. We had our own office, precinct maps, and phone bank.  
I found the experience of contacting voters, distributing literature, 
and posting signs to help elect a young Democratic president quite 
exhilarating, and we impressed the local politicians by accurately 
predicting the percentage of votes that Kennedy would win in the 
14th Ward. 
 In 1960, I was still working at Kingsley House. My duties included 
going through the neighborhood and explaining to residents the 
resources available to help them with home rehabilitation. Kingsley 
had a contract with the city’s Urban Redevelopment Authority (URA) 
to be the rehabilitation program’s ambassadors in East Liberty.
68
 URA director Bob Pease and his staff came to see our work and 
were favorably impressed, to the extent that Pease offered me a job  
at the URA. But, as mentioned briefly in the previous chapter,  
I turned it down for a more innovative opportunity. Calvin “Cal” 
Hamilton had just become director of Pittsburgh’s Department of  
City Planning, which had installed its first computer system and  
was poised to undertake serious, comprehensive urban planning. 
Hamilton offered me a position as senior social planner. I thought 
that trying to understand the human consequences of urban  
development was an important role that appealed to my social  
work background, so I chose the city job. 
 My specific responsibilities were to interpret how urban renewal 
was affecting families and neighborhoods and to create a more 
humane strategy for assisting those relocated due to public-sector 
development activities. We focused on increasing the representation 
of affected areas in decision-making processes and on developing 
procedures that would be sensitive to the needs of those displaced. 
I assembled the Social Planning Advisory Committee, including 
business, labor, academic, and neighborhood leaders and chaired by 
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette publisher William Block, that would review 
the department’s work and recommend policy changes related to 
planning and development. As the accompanying charts demonstrate, 
we thoroughly documented the migration patterns of displaced Hill 
District residents and the resulting demographic changes in the city. 
(See chart on page 69.) 
 Working at City Planning removed me from campaigning, because 
the department received federal funds and its employees were there-
fore governed by the Hatch Act’s prohibition against partisan political 
activity. But I was still interested enough in politics that Green and 
I attended the county Democratic Party’s annual Jefferson-Jackson 
Day dinner in 1963. I remember seeing Aldo Colautti, executive 
assistant to Mayor Joseph Barr, and city solicitor David Craig there. 
I don’t believe I had known them previously. Colautti was pleasantly 
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These charts show data from maps that I created for the Pittsburgh Department of City  
Planning and its Social Planning Advisory Committee in 1962, and show how movement  
of residents displaced by urban development in the Lower Hill furthered patterns of racial  
segregation. The maps document that White families relocated primarily to neighborhoods 
south of the Monongahela River, such as Beechview, while African Americans moved  
into sections of the Upper Hill that were already predominantly Black.
Relocation of White and African American Families from the 
Lower Hill District to other City of Pittsburgh Neighborhoods
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surprised to discover that someone from City Planning cared  
about politics. 
 Shortly thereafter I received a phone call from Colautti. He was 
looking for someone to coordinate the employment training activities 
now available under the federal Manpower Development and  
Training Act of 1962. I accepted his offer and joined the mayor’s staff  
in spring 1964.
Plenty of Challenges
 I arrived at an exciting and challenging time. In the mid-1960s, 
the mayor’s office was at the vortex of numerous local and national 
forces that were reshaping Pittsburgh and significantly changing  
the role and responsibility of city government. We were dealing with:
 • the civil rights movement’s demands for equity and opportunity 
  for underrepresented populations, expressed through marches,  
  picketing, and mass meetings, many of which targeted the   
  mayor’s office;
 • major riots in Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit, which left  
  the mayor’s staff constantly fearful that a local incident might 
  trigger a similarly violent reaction in Pittsburgh;
 • major expansion of the federal financial resources offered  
  to U.S. cities;
 • initial seeds of decline in steel and other manufacturing indus-  
  tries, then the core economic driver of the Pittsburgh region;
 • growing tension between the classic Democratic political  
  machine and the professional staff of city government, as the  
  influence of technical specialists began to overshadow that  
  of ward chairs; and
 • evolving, tense relations between the mayor’s office and  
  City Council, and between city and county government.
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 The mayor himself was overshadowed at times. His predecessor, 
David Lawrence (Pittsburgh’s mayor from 1946 through 1958  
and then Pennsylvania governor from 1959 to 1963), remained a  
dominant figure in local policymaking. Barr, who had been elected 
five times to the Pennsylvania State Senate before running for mayor  
in 1959, was more low key than Lawrence was but skilled in legislative 
compromise. In the turbulent, disruption-filled environment of the 
1960s, Barr was the right man for the job. Never vengeful when  
attacked politically and capable of respecting differences, Barr  
defused potentially volatile issues whereas Lawrence might have 
tried to exert control over situations that could not have been  
controlled. Barr gave his staff ample room to do what they considered 
best for the city. He was an old-line political figure, but he adapted  
to new political realities. 
 Although I was the mayor’s assistant secretary for manpower,  
I did not have much direct contact with the mayor, for Barr had  
entrusted Colautti with considerable responsibility. Colautti wrote 
the mayor’s speeches, drafted the budget, and managed the staff.  
He had shown himself to be worthy of trust: He had no personal  
ambitions, extremely modest tastes, and a great respect for the stature 
of elected officials. In 1998, when Pitt PhD student Michael Snow 
asked him in an interview to what extent he was responsible for  
Mayor Barr’s policies, Colautti replied:
 You have to remind yourself, and I used to have to remind 
  some of my staff colleagues, that our ability to see our ideas come   
 to fruition were due to the fact that we worked for a mayor and  
 a city council who had to run for election and stuck their necks  
 out to support those ideas, even if they were unpopular. …  
 No staff person, no matter how effective, could do it, unless  
 he were willing to do the tough part of the job, which is to run  
 for election.
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 Colautti also was willing to be the mayor’s “bad cop.” He was a 
demanding manager, and he regularly clashed with ward chairs over 
patronage and other political issues and with the media over his  
control of access to the mayor. Ironically, when a tough issue arose 
and Colautti didn’t want to deal with it personally, he sent the media 
in to see the mayor—and they sometimes came out more confused 
than enlightened. As Colautti would put it, “The mayor is not dumb, 
but he often talks in a circular way.” 
 The actual work was interesting, too. We were on the front end  
of the economic shock treatment that Pittsburgh would receive over 
the next 40 years, as the metals industries that had fueled the city  
for so long were showing their first signs of trouble. My task was to 
coordinate the dozen or so job training programs functioning in the 
city and to connect them with community groups that could help 
them to locate candidates for training or retraining. We had no direct 
responsibility over the programs, as they neither worked for us nor 
received their funding from the city, but we sought to draw on the 
mayor’s stature and our ties to the federal government to bring  
everyone to the table and ensure that available job training funds 
were used effectively. 
 Two important principles of mediation worked in my favor as  
I built a citywide job training system out of the mayor’s office.  
First, I had legitimate neutrality because we were not connected 
directly with any of the players; everyone could see that my only 
agenda was to achieve quality outcomes. Second, having a powerful 
base of authority strengthened my position as a mediator.  
 We tried to project anticipated needs in the health care and  
leisure sectors as well as the demand for basic skills like plumbing 
and electrical work and to persuade local unions to open up their 
training programs to underrepresented groups. 
 I dealt with a fascinating range of individuals each day. One minute 
I would be talking with senior White House staffers, and the next 
call might be from a local resident trying to find a training program. 
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Because of my background in community work, I also was called on to 
defuse community problems—a rather tense assignment during the 
civil rights years, when we were always worrying about what incident 
might cause the city to erupt into rioting. 
 One hot summer day, I got a call about a problem in a Hill District 
housing project. Inexplicably, large bugs were showing up in the 
 residents’ water. They were angry as hell, and they wanted clean 
water in a hurry. I immediately contacted the public works department 
and arranged for several street-sweeping trucks with considerable 
water-carrying capacity to come to the Hill District. I met them at  
the housing project. As residents came out with empty containers,  
the public works staff began pouring water out of their trucks—and  
it was full of bugs! I began wondering whether I would leave the Hill 
alive or dead that day. Upon inquiring of the public works staff,  
however, I discovered that they had driven to the Hill District and 
then filled their tanks from a fire hydrant just a short distance away.  
 “Look, we screwed up,” I told the residents. “We’ll get these guys 
back with clean water, I promise you.” I didn’t leave the site until  
the trucks returned from another part of town with verifiably  
bug-free water.
Structuring the War on Poverty
 In August 1964, President Lyndon Johnson signed the center- 
piece of his Great Society War on Poverty legislation, the Economic 
Opportunity Act. This law authorized the federal government to send 
money directly to local governments to fund such poverty initiatives 
as the Job Corps, the Neighborhood Youth Corps, and Head Start. 
The most innovative and controversial provision called for the creation 
of local Community Action Programs (CAPs) that would work to  
eliminate poverty. The law required CAPs to involve substantial  
representation of the populations being served. 
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 As early as March 1964, when President Johnson called for  
an economic opportunity act in a special message to Congress,  
we anticipated the potential for millions of poverty dollars to come  
to Pittsburgh. Colautti encouraged me to put together a program 
quickly so that we would be in position to become one of the first  
big-city recipients of funding. Within two months, I was chairing  
a planning committee, and Green, Jim Cunningham, ACTION- 
Housing’s Kiernan Stenson, and I were making frequent trips  
to Washington to keep tabs on the developing legislation and get  
direction for our local efforts. In fact, we became informal consultants 
to the executive branch staff who were working on the federal  
legislation, and they came to Pittsburgh to learn from us.  
 As Neil Gilbert (who worked for the poverty program in Pittsburgh 
and went on to a distinguished career at the University of California, 
Berkeley, School of Social Welfare) described in his PhD dissertation, 
we decided, in the interest of efficiency, to involve existing agencies 
in the poverty battle rather than create new ones. So we had to sell 
social service agencies on the idea of Community Action Programs, 
including the expected citizen participation requirements. Ironically, 
my own planning committee sought no citizen review of its grant  
proposal due to the perceived urgency of completing it quickly so as  
to be among the first in line for federal funding. I was caught in an 
awkward position, as I was leading an effort to develop a program 
that we hoped would increase representation and opportunity for  
lower-income people and other underrepresented populations, and  
yet we ourselves were leaving these groups out of the planning.  
In the implementation phase, this initial oversight was corrected. 
 We felt that, to keep the project manageable, we needed to have 
no more than eight separate neighborhoods each getting their own 
Community Action Program. To encompass a large swath of territory 
and thereby gain wide-ranging multiracial support, we defined eight 
fairly large “neighborhoods”; the whole North Side, for example,  
was defined as a single impoverished community, and the South Side, 
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West End, and Beltzhoover also were treated as one neighborhood 
despite the ethnic and geographic distinctions among them. We faced 
unexpected resistance in Lawrenceville and Bloomfield, where Catholic 
parish representatives supported participating in the program but 
other civic leaders opposed having their neighborhoods designated  
as being in poverty. As Cunningham recalled in his book Urban  
Leadership in the Sixties, the Lawrenceville ward chair took his  
objection directly to Mayor Barr, who “gave him sympathy but no  
support.” 2  The disagreement became quite rancorous, to the extent 
that I saw residents of Catholic neighborhoods spitting at nuns.  
In fact, Lawrenceville withdrew from participation in the poverty 
program in 1966.
You May Think You Have Three Choices …
 Our planning committee made one other crucial strategic decision. 
While we intended to have existing agencies deliver services, we  
proposed creating one new nonprofit, the Mayor’s Committee on  
Human Resources (MCHR), to oversee the Pittsburgh poverty  
program. This was a significant departure from other cities, such as 
Chicago, where Mayor Richard J. Daley clearly expressed his desire  
for direct control over the program. Calling the oversight body a 
“mayor’s committee” but making it a quasi-public body outside the 
purview of the mayor’s office provided political insulation: If the  
program succeeded the mayor could take credit, but if it spun its 
wheels ineffectively, he could say that it was not his program. 
 To guide my colleagues in the mayor’s office toward supporting 
this arrangement, I compared it to two other alternatives. On one 
hand, we could seize complete control over the poverty program in 
Pittsburgh (and be held fully responsible for what it could not achieve). 
On the other hand, we could give the money to other nonprofit  
agencies with no strings attached and no control over what happened 
next. Between these two options, I defined the middle ground  
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as having Mayor Barr appoint members of and participate as part  
of a committee that would nevertheless operate independently  
of the mayor’s office. In that context, we quickly agreed on creating  
the MCHR as the most reasonable solution.  
 One of my best students at the Pitt School of Social Work,  
Mike Eichler, frequently observed my use of this mediating tool.  
After joining the social work faculty at San Diego State University, 
Eichler authored a book titled Consensus Organizing. On pages 
101–103 of that book, he described my “Looks Like We Have  
Three Choices” method. Here are some excerpts:
 There were many tricks I learned from Mo [sic]. I tried  
 to absorb all of them, but I will always have a favorite.  
 The all-time best one had Mo spending hours with a disjointed,  
 unfocused, argumentative group. He listened and listened  
 then finally spoke. Then he listened and listened some more.  
 Then he sputtered with what invariably looked like absolute 
 spontaneity, “It looks like we have three choices.” In all the  
 years I watched and learned, Mo never felt there were four  
 choices, two choices, or one choice. There were always three. …  
 Then he pulled out a magician’s sword to carve the lady.  
 He made the first choice so radical that everyone in the audience  
 would find it too extreme. He would then have a third choice, 
 equally radical but in the opposite direction. Then, in between  
 these two extreme choices that had no constituency, he would  
 sandwich in a second choice that sounded moderate, practical,  
 appropriate, and logical. … I’m telling you, I saw him do this  
 hundreds of times. He had enormous power through this skill  
 he had perfected. He always made option number two the  
 approach that would help the most considering the reality  
 of the hand that had been dealt. People always left the room  
 happy, committed, and determined to carry out their decision.
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 Years after realizing how this [three-choice method] worked,  
 I was asked to bring together a group of activists from throughout  
 the state of Connecticut. We had a series of meetings in Hartford.  
 There was a lot of tension and distrust in the room at the meetings. 
 Participants had very strong views on how the state should help  
 low-income communities. Finally, at one of the meetings, I framed 
 the debate and shouted, “Hey, I think we have three choices.”  
 I made choice number one and three some of the worst ideas  
 that had been proposed during the day. Choice number one was 
 the government’s muddiest thinking and choice number three  
 was the activists’ equivalent. The second choice never looked  
 so good. I had a modest goal—to get out of the meeting alive.  
 It worked. On my way out the door, shaking hands and thanking 
 God, one of the quietest participants pulled me over and whispered,  
 “Tell Mo Coleman I said hello.” It turned out Mo had worked in  
 Hartford a decade earlier. She knew Mo had moved to Pittsburgh; 
 she also knew that I had lived in Pittsburgh. She connected the  
 dots. She wasn’t mad. She was smiling.
A Professionalized City (Most of the Time) 
 The creation of a separate, nonpolitical entity to run the poverty 
program in Pittsburgh was part of a notable shift over which both 
Lawrence and Barr presided during their mayoral tenures: from  
patronage to professionalism. Historically, the Democratic machine 
had flourished largely by making government jobs available to its 
supporters, and much of government’s largesse reached local citizens 
via their ward chair, maintaining an unmistakable connection between 
access to benefits and support for the machine. But Pennsylvania  
had finally passed civil service reform in 1941 (a mere 58 years after 
the enactment of federal civil service legislation in 1883), and elected 
officials no longer wielded as much power over the employment pipeline. 
Moreover, accepting federal funds for planning and development 
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caused employees in those departments to become barred from partisan 
political activity under the Hatch Act. 
 Lawrence and Barr remained old-school in some political appoint-
ments, as illustrated by a classic episode that ensued after Lawrence 
appointed Pittsburgh City Council member Fred Weir as an Allegheny 
County Court of Common Pleas judge. Lawrence, Barr, and their 
top aides (Walt Giesey and Colautti, respectively) met to decide who 
should fill the vacant City Council seat. (Technically, there would  
be a special election, but a candidate backed by Lawrence and Barr 
would be virtually assured of victory.) It was agreed that, to retain 
proper geographic and ethnic balance, the nominee should, like Weir, 
be a Protestant from Shadyside or Squirrel Hill. “How about Craig?” 
one of the aides asked. Lawrence and Barr began their analysis, 
reviewing such crucial factors as the prospective nominee’s genealogy 
and his relatives. As they did so, Giesey said to Colautti, “That’s  
not Craig—they’re talking about someone else.” It turned out that, 
while the aides had intended to suggest city solicitor David Craig, 
their question had caused Lawrence and Barr to recall and review  
the suitability of labor lawyer Craig Kuhn. Satisfied with the results 
of their review, they phoned Kuhn, who accepted the invitation,  
was elected, and served on City Council for 10 years. 
 With regard to the operation of government agencies, however, 
Lawrence and Barr did not fight the change from patronage to  
professionalism; they welcomed it. Not only were they committed 
to making Pittsburgh a better place, but they believed that running 
high-quality programs was good politics. Barr could have influenced 
the MCHR’s hiring decisions, but he did not. The only time I saw  
Barr become irritated with the committee was when he felt we were 
moving too slowly to get programs running. No MCHR employee 
came out of the Democratic political organization. We selected two 
highly qualified African Americans, first assistant U.S. attorney  
David Hill and then social worker Dave Epperson, as directors.
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 Enjoying firm political backing and no undue interference with 
its work, our planning committee achieved its goal. Pittsburgh, then 
the nation’s 16th-largest city, was one of the first 10 recipients of the 
poverty program funding through the newly created federal Office  
of Economic Opportunity. We were invited to ask for what we thought 
we needed, and we got what we asked for: $1.5 million for fiscal year 
1965 and $7.3 million the following year. I was not directly involved 
once we launched the MCHR and it hired its own staff, but the  
Johnson administration considered our work a political plus and  
an example for the nation, as our sensitivity to social service needs 
was widely credited with helping us to avert the race riots that  
had ravaged other cities. 
 My satisfaction with the proposal as it developed did get me  
an unanticipated political lecture from then Governor Lawrence.  
One Friday night, I had a drink with a young Pittsburgh Press  
reporter, Roger Stuart, and shared what we were doing to pursue  
poverty program funds. He thought it was a good story and got him-
self a front-page Sunday newspaper byline on an article about our 
plans to address poverty in Pittsburgh. The article was accurate and 
positive. I don’t recall any immediate feedback on it. The following 
Saturday, Lawrence, who frequently took over his old office during 
nonbusiness hours when he came to Pittsburgh, called me in. He was 
an intimidating figure, seated behind a spacious old desk and knocking 
his ring against it—which I knew was a sign of agitation.
“Young man, do you want to keep this job?” he asked me.  
“Yes, I do.”  
“Did you see that article in the Pittsburgh Press last week?” 
I said yes again.  
“That was a good news article, and you were quoted in it. If you  
want to keep your job, you never get quoted in good news articles,  
the mayor gets quoted.” 
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 That was the last time I received positive media recognition during 
my time in city government. 
 The poverty program did not do as much as we had hoped to 
extricate people from poverty except for those youths who obtained 
employment and training through the Job Corps and Neighborhood 
Youth Corps initiatives. It was more about improving social and  
educational services for lower-income groups than about enhancing 
financial resources. But it did two other important things: It opened 
up the health and social services fields to people (primarily those 
in underrepresented groups) who could not otherwise have entered 
these sectors due to educational disadvantages, and it provided  
management training for a rising generation of young African  
American leaders. Hill, who went on to become a successful attorney  
in Cleveland and an important figure in Ohio politics; Epperson,  
later dean of the Pitt School of Social Work; Ron Davenport, who was 
dean of Duquesne University’s law school before becoming a major 
broadcasting entrepreneur; and Milt Washington, subsequently  
a prominent Pittsburgh real estate developer, all worked in Pitts-
burgh’s poverty program, as did many other men and women who 
went on to succeed in business, law, academia, and health care.  
The poverty program created their opportunity ladder. Along the way, 
we discovered that people hired directly out of lower-income commu-
nities often could connect with their clients more effectively than  
the credentialed professionals. 
 I also successfully applied my experience in racial reconciliation 
during my consulting work for Henry Ford II, helping to address  
tensions within his company. At Ford’s plant in Mahwah, N.J.,  
the daytime shift was primarily White, African Americans from  
Harlem dominated the night shift, and there were few Blacks in middle 
management. Racial conflict had spawned poor work performance 
and even some acts of sabotage. We worked out a plan to increase  
the number of African American managers and to mediate plant 
 employees’ concerns, reducing animosities and restoring productivity.
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The Riotous Days
 On April 4, 1968, Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated  
in Memphis, Tenn. Dr. King’s death was a match to a tinderbox in 
American cities, many of which had already experienced severe race 
riots. In Pittsburgh, we had been on the edge for a couple of years, 
worrying about any incident with the police that might trigger  
a violent reaction. King’s death confronted us with the possibility  
of a major riot. By April 5, groups of young men were gathering in  
the Hill District, breaking windows and setting fires. The mayor  
and his staff had to determine a strategy for containing the violence 
while also planning how, after calm was restored, the city could  
reconcile differences and rebuild. 
 Many others have described these days; I will limit myself here  
to recalling a few significant events and how I experienced them.
April 5
 On Friday morning, April 5, five of us met in the mayor’s office 
to strategize a response to the growing riots. The participants were 
Mayor Barr; David Craig, formerly city solicitor and now public safety 
director; Robert Pease, director of the Urban Redevelopment Authority;  
James Slusser, superintendent of the City of Pittsburgh Bureau of Police; 
and me. 
 As we entered, the mayor was answering telephone calls from 
irate merchants in the Hill District and from fearful residents all over 
the city. Slusser demanded permission for the police to use any force 
needed to halt the looting and firebombing. Pease, Craig, and I felt 
that shooting young African Americans would have disastrous conse-
quences for the future of race relations in Pittsburgh. The mayor was 
uncertain as to what position to take. 
 The person who Mayor Barr trusted most was Aldo Colautti, who 
had recently taken a position with the Ford Foundation in New York. 
We decided to call him. In his calm, rational way, Colautti told the 
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mayor that we could not become another Newark, (where many had 
been killed) or we might not have a peaceful city again for decades. 
He advised the mayor that lethal force should be used only when life, 
not property, was threatened and that he should call in the National 
Guard for a show of force. This course of action was followed. Although 
significant property damage occurred, only one person died, and that 
was not because of police action. 
 Here is how Colautti remembered the episode in a 1989 interview 
with a panel of Pittsburgh scholars:
 I got a call in my apartment in New York City from Dave [Craig], 
 who was the director of public safety at that time. The riots had  
 broken out here. Things were pretty bad, I gather. Dave told me 
 that looting had occurred in the Hill District. Of course, the police 
 had been turned out. They were debating whether to call out  
 the National Guard, and the mayor was under pressure to have 
 orders given to the police to start shooting looters. Dave Craig 
 was trying to apply some limitations. … 
 On Sunday night, I called the mayor’s office. I had a private  
 number and I called Joe (Barr). It was the first time, I think,  
 I had talked to him since I left. I didn’t let him on that I knew 
 what was going on. … 
 “You left me,” I think is the way he put it. “Now, I’ve got telegrams 
 on my desk from merchants in the Hill District,” and they were 
 demanding that the police be directed to start shooting. I pretended 
 I didn’t know that and I said, “Joe, that would be a mistake.  
 Because when this is over, you’re going to be living with the same 
 people that you’re shooting. I know it’s bad, but there has to be 
 other ways in which to bring it under control without shooting.” 
 … I said, “Bring the National Guard in. Bring in a show of force. 
 Put more people than you need and let the public record show 
 that you’re doing that, but don’t start shooting unless somebody   
 has to shoot in self-defense.”
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 Well, Joe mumbled and groaned, and we had a long talk. I’d say 
 it was about 45 minutes. Of course, he didn’t know why I had 
 called him. To make a long story short … he resisted the pressures 
 from the police chief and others to start shooting.
 By bringing in the National Guard as an outside force, Barr  
insulated the police from having to be the primary enforcement 
system during the riots and therefore protected them from becoming 
permanently branded as the bad guys. The police didn’t like being  
restrained; they had a strong and understandable distaste for the 
kids who were causing trouble. But, in this moment of high stress, 
they needed to be restrained. If you can delay a confrontation,  
sometimes over time the level of emotion will decline and you can 
defuse the risk of violence. 
 I learned enduring lessons from Colautti’s performance in his 
phone conversation with the mayor. Building on a firmly established 
relationship of trust, he conveyed a sense of calmness and reason in 
the midst of crisis. He guided the Mayor through assessing the long-
term consequences of a high-stress decision, showing conclusively 
that one course of action (i.e., restraining the police from shooting 
to kill unless lives were threatened) would result in more desirable 
outcomes for the city. Colautti did not lose his head, and his reasoned 
discussion quite likely spared us from a further escalation of both 
immediate violence and long-term strife.
April 6
 I had heard that, during riots in another city, young African 
American men and women were recruited to help in calming things 
down and were given red fluorescent vests to wear in their neighbor-
hoods. I thought that was a good idea. I shared it with Craig, who 
liked the idea as well and got Mayor Barr’s approval to implement it. 
Soon, we had Black youths in red vests patrolling the streets of 
Homewood, urging their peers not to riot. 
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 In a later interview for Michael Snow’s University of Pittsburgh 
dissertation, Craig could not remember who gave him the idea, but  
he remembered the flak that he received for adopting it: “I was in  
the East Liberty police station late Saturday evening, and we had 
hundreds of arrestees in the lockup there, and I did have an ear- 
beating from some police sergeants who kind of grabbed me and said, 
‘Look there, director. Look at that son of a bitch wearing a red vest. 
I arrested him for this and that a week ago, and now he’s lording it 
[over us].’ ” 
 The criticism was fierce; when some police subsequently circulated 
a petition to fire Craig, the red vests were a prominent element of 
their critique. Police were particularly upset that the media were  
giving favorable treatment to youths who law enforcement, in some 
cases, viewed as troublemakers and criminals. But I had worked 
through leaders I trusted, such as Homewood’s William “Bouie” 
Haden, who were respected in their neighborhoods and who I knew 
would make carefully considered decisions as to who should get the 
vests. Some of the youths built on this experience to pursue further 
education and eventually became community leaders themselves. 
Craig survived the attempt to sack him and later served 16 years  
as a distinguished Commonwealth Court judge.
April 7
 Around midday on Palm Sunday, April 7, while the Hill District 
was still smoldering, a large crowd gathered in the Lower Hill.  
A protest march had been planned. The protesters would march from 
the Lower Hill to Point State Park, where they would be addressed  
by various civil rights leaders. 
 There was a debate within the police as to whether to let the 
march go on. Before the march started, a cordon of police formed, 
positioning themselves to block the protesters.  
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 I was in the mayor’s office that morning, fielding telephone calls 
from angry supporters of the march. My own opinion was that it 
should go on, but I was not the decision maker. I kept my opinion to 
myself while enduring a morning full of aggravated verbal attacks 
from callers. 
 Alma Speed Fox, an important civil-rights leader and then chief 
of staff of the Pittsburgh branch of the NAACP, recalled (in an April 
2, 2008, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette retrospective article) the tense events 
that were transpiring on the street while I was trying to pacify phone 
callers. Fox had obtained the permit for the march, but as she headed 
for the starting point of the route, at Centre Avenue and Crawford 
Street—now called Freedom Corner—she heard on her car radio that 
the march had been canceled.
 “I said, ‘How could it be called off?’ I had the permit in my pocket.” 
 The only person who could have called it off was NAACP president 
 and prominent Pittsburgh attorney Byrd Brown, and she knew  
 he had not.
 When Mrs. Fox and her husband arrived at Freedom Corner,  
 they saw that the police had formed a line across Centre Avenue  
 along Crawford Street.
 “They were in their riot gear, with their helmets and their great 
 big clubs,” Mrs. Fox said. Their job was to keep the marchers  
 from moving past Freedom Corner into Downtown. “People were 
 hollering and screaming and you turned your head and looked 
 back and the Hill was on fire,” Mrs. Fox said.
 During the verbal exchange Mrs. Fox looked down and noticed 
 the wide stance of a police officer in front of her.
 “I scooted right under there and got to the other side,” she recalled. 
 The crowd, encouraged by Mrs. Fox, surged forward and the police 
 pushed back. “By that time the police had picked me up, one had 
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 each limb and threw me in the paddy wagon,” she said. After  
 some more angry words and negotiations between Mr. Brown and 
 Public Safety Director David Craig, the march was permitted.
 “Well, ... we walked to Downtown Pittsburgh, we walked past 
 Kaufmann’s, not one window was broken, not one thing was done 
 that was disorderly. … It was a peaceful demonstration and we 
 gave honor to Dr. King.”
The Struggle Inside the Movement
 During the civil rights years, there sometimes seemed to be  
a march every other day. If people weren’t marching, they were  
picketing—either trying to put allegedly discriminatory employers 
and real estate developers to shame or advocating for desired  
legislation. I was frequently out there alongside them—not for the 
exercise but out of commitment to the drive for a more equitable  
society. In fact, I was at the National Mall for Dr. King’s “I have  
a dream” speech, which was truly a pivotal moment in my life  
as well as in the civil rights movement.  
 Deciding to support the civil rights cause was easier than figuring 
out who within the movement to support. In Pittsburgh, as elsewhere, 
the movement had its intense internal divisions. I can remember 
meetings with African American pastors who felt we were giving too 
much credence to militant characters not representative of the Black 
community. Our answer was basically that we would rather try to 
involve a broad range of community leaders in the system than risk 
having them continue in their disillusionment and alienation. 
 African Americans were facing the question of whether they  
could best achieve social equity by becoming integrated into a  
Caucasian-styled system or by developing separate structures that 
rested on Black leadership and Black values. The civil rights move-
ment actually contained three separate threads: integrationists, who 
believed that giving underrepresented groups new opportunities and 
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new access to power could minimize racial division; separatists,  
who argued that the racial schisms were too powerful and that Blacks 
should develop independent systems rather than becoming absorbed 
into the dominant culture; and Black youths who had no strong  
ideology, just anger at what they viewed as a repressive establishment. 
This third group alone was responsible for the riots. Both the integra- 
tionists and the separatists worked hard to stop activity that they 
saw as destroying the African American community.  
 I believe that the presence of the separatists sometimes strength-
ened the position of civil-rights moderates in their negotiations, 
because we knew that if we didn’t collaborate with people like  
Byrd Brown, we would end up having to deal with the really tough 
guys. That strategy had its limitations when negotiating with the 
moderates made the militant separatists more dissatisfied. But over 
time, the militants made their own accommodations and worked 
within the system, sometimes very successfully. As a result, we see 
far more African Americans in important positions in our schools, 
hospitals, law firms, and major corporations than at any previous 
time in our history.
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C H A P T E R  5
Safe Places for Policy Debate:  
Civic Peacemaking in Hartford and the  
University of Pittsburgh Institute of Politics
 In 1969, I left Mayor Joseph Barr’s staff and joined the University  
of Pittsburgh School of Social Work on a full-time basis. Shortly 
thereafter, I was named acting dean. Entanglement in the racial  
tensions of the ’60s had made the School of Social Work such a  
lightning rod that there had actually been talk of eliminating it.  
I was able to help in reestablishing the school’s stature within the 
University as an important and academically rigorous program.  
 In 1972, I accepted a new challenge: becoming dean of the School 
of Social Work at the University of Connecticut. While most of the 
UConn campus is located in Storrs, the School of Social Work,  
along with the university’s law and business schools, sits in West 
Hartford. Though still recognized as the insurance capital of the 
world, Hartford was facing major inner-city decline. I became active 
in community affairs there—and landed in the midst of a cultural  
and ethnic boxing match. 
 At that time, the Greater Hartford Process, a nonprofit organi-
zation guided primarily by leaders of the city’s major corporations, 
heavily influenced the region’s planning agenda. (For simplicity, 
Pittsburgh-area readers can think of this organization as, until 1975, 
Hartford’s approximate equivalent to the Allegheny Conference on 
Community Development.) Commonly referred to simply as Process, 
this elite entity had adopted a bold solution to center-city decline: 
relocate the low-income residents by creating a new community in  
the nearby rural town of Coventry. James Rouse, famous for devel-
oping the planned city of Columbia, Md., in the 1960s, was hired to 
assist in the planning. 
90
 It was a grand idea, but when the plan became public, Coventry’s 
residents, wedded to their quaint rural landscape and unexcited 
about migration from inner-city Hartford, mounted such fierce  
grassroots opposition that the plan became politically unachievable. 
Still worse, Hartford’s substantial Puerto Rican community was  
angered by the leakage of a 1975 Process internal memo that recom-
mended reducing the migration of Puerto Ricans into the city and 
consolidating “the welfare-dependent elements of this population”  
in two neighborhoods. On other issues as well, Hartford’s corporate 
leadership clashed with community organizations, which accused 
Process of placing corporate interests before residents’ needs. 
 Under this barrage of attacks, the Process leaders shelved their 
grand plans, laid off their big staff, and ran for political cover. Histor-
ically an entrepreneurial catalyst for development, Process retreated 
into the role of a mediating organization. But Hartford’s corporate 
leaders did not want to simply walk away from their community.  
So, in 1977, they asked me to take over the organization and try  
to move it in a new direction. 
 At the press conference announcing my appointment, I stated 
that Process “must rebuild trust in the region” and said that our 
emphasis would be to “help other people do what they do best” rather 
than to develop and try to push through our own plans. Nevertheless, 
the reemergence of Process, even in this sharply curtailed form, was 
greeted with overt hostility. In fact, 12 community organizations 
came together as the Coalition Against the Hartford Process to fight 
my new employer’s “racist policy.” Some of my social work students  
at UConn hanged me in effigy when I took the Process job. 
 To surmount this wall of mistrust, I applied the methodology that 
had worked for me back in the days of Pittsburgh’s poverty program: 
consensus building through inclusion of marginalized voices. As Jose 
La Luz, a prominent Puerto Rican activist, editorialized in the July 
25, 1977, Hartford Courant, if I wanted to make Process an effective 
broker I should open lines of communication between the business 
91
leaders who “really hold political power in Hartford” and the Puerto 
Ricans. I took up the challenge, persuading the former chair of Aetna 
Inc. to accompany me and meet with Puerto Rican leaders. Much as  
I had done with the Mayor’s Committee on Human Resources in  
Pittsburgh, I reconstructed the Process board into one where executives 
would rub shoulders with community people, including representatives 
of the Puerto Rican and African American communities. By giving the 
groups access to top corporate leadership, we strengthened Process’ 
new image as a broker and supporter of community interests. 
 We also reshaped Process’s agenda, replacing a relatively narrow 
focus on the priorities of business leaders with broad concern for  
community issues. Instead of strategic planning and social engineering, 
we focused on improving city residents’ quality of life through such 
means as sustainable housing, neighborhood revitalization, improved 
public transportation, and trying to strengthen the moribund city 
school system. 
 Process rented an inner-city house as its headquarters and gave 
free office space within the building to one of the most radical Saul 
Alinsky-style community organizing groups in Hartford. Not only did 
this expression of generosity build bridges, but it also dispelled public 
fears that we were still secretly plotting actions adverse to underrep-
resented populations and neighborhood groups. Indeed, it would have 
been hard for us to plan anything in secret when the people downstairs 
could walk upstairs and into our office at any moment. 
 In 1975, angered by that undiplomatic internal memo on narrowing 
lower-income groups’ in-migration and housing opportunities, the 
Hartford school board had placed an official ban on all communication 
with Process. So we knew we were making progress when, in February 
1979, the school board rescinded its communication ban. “Process has 
changed its style and has been putting its money where its mouth is,” 
a February 1979 Hartford Courant article stated. “To a large extent 
it has regained the confidence of community leaders and the respect 
of the public.” 
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 Economically, our impact was modest at best; politically, it was 
transforming. People who had previously been outsiders, able to get 
attention only through hostile protests, came to see themselves as 
valued players who could get their interests met through participatory 
engagement. The wide gulf between well-heeled business interests 
and low-income communities was bridged somewhat. The Hartford 
Courant recognized that achievement in a September 21, 1980, article 
titled “President to Leave after Transforming Social Planning Agency” 
upon my announcement that I was retiring as Process president and 
returning to Pittsburgh:
 Eugenio Caro, the fiery Hispanic activist who has led hundreds 
 of angry poor people to protests at City Hall, was lecturing  
 a group of conservative corporate types on the history of Puerto 
 Rican migration to Hartford.
 The scene? The office of Greater Hartford Process, an unusual  
 social planning agency that is one of the few places in the city 
 where corporate bigwigs, neighborhood leaders and elected  
 officials from the city and suburbs meet regularly.
 The man who brings them together—Process President Morton 
 D. Coleman—is now leaving after transforming Process  
 and playing a key behind-the-scenes role as a political broker  
 and peacemaker in Hartford. …
 When Coleman was elected president of the agency on June 15, 
 1977, Process was still the huge private development venture  
 created by businesses in the late 1960s that, among other  
 things, tried unsuccessfully to build a $250 million new town  
 in Coventry. …
 Now Process is a catalyst, bringing together corporate people  
 with money and neighborhood leaders who need it. It has opened  
 up its once-closed board meetings, added more minority group   
93
 members to its board and dispelled many of the bad feelings  
 of the past.
 The next day, an editorial in the Courant credited the Process, 
during my tenure there, with having “established a rapport with  
and between diverse groups to an extent unusual in what is often  
a fratricidal urban America.” Really, all I had done was to act on my 
belief that diverse groups ought to be at the table. Before my arrival, 
Process had behaved as if business leadership had the right to use its 
economic and political power however it pleased, without regard for 
competing interests. After my arrival, Process became a mediating 
force between corporate and community leaders, seeking common 
ground and ways to use its resources for mutual benefit. Listening 
carefully, refusing to argue, and offering meaningful help can dissipate 
almost any bitterness—not overnight (because restoring trust takes 
more than one friendly meeting) but certainly within two years.
Civic Resuscitation in Pittsburgh
 I left Process to resume teaching in the Pitt School of Social Work. 
But the civic peacemaking role I had played in Hartford was not to 
be forgotten. By the late 1980s, forces within the University came 
together to impel me toward a new bridge-building venture, though 
with a different clientele. 
 University Chancellor Wesley W. Posvar, feeling that Pitt should 
build stronger connections with its surrounding community, created a 
committee to discuss how the University could become more involved 
in the city. I was a staff member on the committee, and after the 
report was published, I developed a proposal. Among the resulting 
recommendations was a rather vague plan to create an institute of 
politics that would convene discussions on local policy issues. 
 I developed a proposal for University Provost Rudolph Weingartner 
to form the Institute of Politics as a freestanding entity, reporting 
directly to him rather than lodged within any department. I said that 
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I would do my own fundraising and not depend on the University for 
financial support. Moreover, I proposed to direct the Institute as part  
of my responsibilities as a professor of social work, without taking 
any additional salary. My offer was accepted, and I launched the 
Institute of Politics in 1989.
A Neutral Space for Public Discourse
 I knew that if we wanted elected officials to dialogue openly and 
candidly we would need to provide a safe place for off-the-record 
conversation, one where these public figures could speak their minds 
without fearing unauthorized leaks. 
 The Institute’s programs were always open only to public officials 
and recognized civic leaders, mainly from academia, business, labor, 
the foundation community, and nonprofit agencies. But we did try to 
build bridges between groups who rarely talked to each other. One of 
our most interesting early discoveries was that two influential groups 
of elected officials—state legislators and county commissioners— 
rarely crossed paths. Both groups were appreciative of our efforts  
to bring them together for policy discussions. 
 Originally, we saw elected officials as our target audience; the 
other civic leaders were included so that legislators could hear from 
them. The initial mission statement of the Institute was “to provide 
elected officials with a forum in which they can freely examine and 
discuss difficult policy questions with each other and with experts 
from the University of Pittsburgh and across the nation.” We quickly 
saw that community, business, and foundation leaders also valued 
the discussions taking place at our events; in 1993, the mission state-
ment was rewritten to include them among our target constituencies. 
 Early direction for the Institute came from the Board of Fellows, 
composed of legislators and civic leaders, and an advisory board of 
University administrators and professors. We identified four compo-
nents that were central to establishing the Institute’s credibility:
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 1. Participants: We had to select invitees carefully, ensuring 
  balance and diversity of views and giving legislators access 
  to a range of informed perspectives while maintaining their 
  comfort level.
 2. Issues: Our goals of fostering reasoned, civil policy discussion 
   and finding common ground caused us to steer clear of divisive   
  ideological issues. Fiscal, structural, and resource issues— 
  like how to keep pension systems solvent, build a more efficient  
  water system, or share public services among municipal govern-  
  ments—became our bread and butter.
 3. Product: Every program or publication was developed  
  with quality and balance in mind. It was important for our 
  constituencies to see our work as informative, open, inclusive 
  of various views, and fair to all perspectives. We included  
  different points of view on our planning committees, acted by 
  consensus rather than by majority, and brought in widely  
  recognized experts as featured speakers.
 4. Setting: In addition to making all forums explicitly off the 
   record so that no one would feel the need for posturing, we 
   showed respect for participants’ dignity by using attractive 
  venues. I knew that the best way to keep friendly discussions 
  going was to offer a nice lunch, so the preferred program  
  time became 9 a.m.–noon, with continental breakfast  
  on arrival and lunch following the conclusion of the formal 
   discussion period.
 To encourage open discussion, we eschewed theater-style  
seating for our forums, instead arranging tables in the shape of  
a large rectangle, with everyone sitting around the outside of the  
rectangle and facing each other. This arrangement worked well  
for groups of 60 or fewer, but soon our events were oversubscribed,  
with registration frequently topping 100. 
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A Humble Shop
 We organized nice, professional events, but we kept other costs 
to a minimum. A report to a supporting foundation in 1993, when the 
Institute was still a fledgling operation, pointed out that it had just 
one full-time staff member and that its total capital assets consisted 
of two personal computers. Much of the early work was done by  
doctoral students in social work. 
 Suzanne McDevitt, our first program administrator, had amazing 
success in getting prominent speakers to come in as keynotes for our 
early forums. We offered them no honorarium; we just covered their 
expenses and treated them well. The most attractive hook, McDevitt 
recalled, was that we could promise them the chance to talk directly 
with elected officials. Marie Hamblett, initially hired for one term 
in December 1992 while another student was away, was an outsider 
of sorts—an undergraduate in political science—and was thus in a 
unique position to observe how a staff full of social workers operated. 
Given the responsibility to set up the room for Institute events, she 
would arrange a number of chairs equal to the number of registered 
participants and then would watch in horror as the rest of us came  
in and started removing chairs. “I knew nothing about community  
organizing,” she said, “and it took me a while to learn that if  
100 people were registered, fewer than 100 people would show up,  
and that a full room looks better than a lot of empty chairs.” 
 Internally, the staff culture was transparent and humble, some-
what akin to that of a low-level campaign office. Part-timers shared 
desks and offices, spreading papers across the floor to collate them  
for mailings or program folders. “It was a very unfamiliar environment 
for me,” Hamblett recalled. “People freely talked about their feelings, 
their health issues, whatever was wrong with them.” Perhaps most 
strategically, no one on the staff cared who got the credit—an essential 
job qualification if you want elected officials to depend on you. 
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 The Institute has always been happy to stay under the radar, 
avoid the limelight, and define success in terms of helping its constit-
uents do well. Grant Oliphant, the late Senator H. John Heinz III’s 
last press secretary and the current president of The Heinz Endow- 
ments, paid the Institute a prized compliment when he stated that he 
likes partnering with the Institute “because they make me look good.” 
 In this regard, our firm commitment to keeping all discussions off 
the record was particularly strategic. Few places exist where elected 
officials can ask questions or express their thoughts freely without 
fear of embarrassment. Ask a dumb-sounding question in a public  
setting and you could become a target for ridicule; come to an Institute 
of Politics forum and you can become better educated in a safe setting. 
As Terry Miller, who became the Institute’s project administrator 
(and only full-time staffer) in 1992, put it, “They knew what they said 
would not be in the newspaper the next day, so they did not have to 
posture; they could just come in and have a civil conversation.” 
 We did have media at some sessions, but only as participants,  
not reporters. One of our memorable early successes was a creative 
forum on public officials and the media. Colorful Pitt communication 
professor Ted Windt, chair of the committee that planned the event, 
devised scenarios in which members of the media played the role  
of legislators while the real elected officials interviewed them.  
The session deepened each group’s appreciation for the other’s job  
and enhanced appreciation for the Institute. 
Reinvigorating a Good Idea
 Although it is hard to measure the concrete policy impact of an  
institute whose main goal is to give policymakers a chance to talk 
with each other, the consistently high turnout at our events suggested 
that we were meeting our constituents’ needs. Increased funding,  
primarily from local foundations, enabled us to expand our programming 
to the point where we were holding about 15 major policy events  
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a year. After my retirement in 1998, Denny McManus became the 
Institute’s first paid director and further broadened its engagement  
of community and nonprofit organizations. 
 After 15 years, however, a sense of stagnation forced the Institute 
to reconsider one of our original self-imposed restrictions—namely, 
our stated commitment to being a neutral convener and not a policy-
making entity. At the outset, as our events became popular, I felt our 
biggest challenge would be that legislators and others would begin  
to expect us to solve policy problems, not just set up first-rate venues 
in which to talk about them. As a result, we steered so far away  
from trying to stimulate policy decisions that we began to receive the  
opposite complaint—namely that we were holding excellent forums 
with no follow-up and no practical impact. Participant evaluations 
would consistently praise the quality of the material presented at 
Institute events and then ask, “Now what?” The foundations that 
funded us, though conceptually supportive of the Institute’s  
communication and education goals, also expressed a desire to  
see more concrete, measurable outcomes. 
 So, in 2005, we took a bold step. We restructured our policy  
committees into nine working groups and told each of them to identify 
a policy issue or problem that could be addressed using the Institute’s 
resources. Beginning that year, our annual retreat included time  
for each policy committee to set its programmatic agenda for the  
following year. Some of the projects were educational in nature,  
such as a comprehensive summary of the region’s infrastructure 
needs or a forum on the value of diversity in the workforce. Others, 
however, were more directly aimed at advancing a policy solution.  
For example, a special committee on municipal pensions generated 
several specific proposals aimed at reducing the widespread  
problem of underfunded pension plans. As usual, our committee  
was broad based and acted by consensus, so controversial alter- 
natives were left on the cutting room floor, but the committee’s  
report and some subsequent behind-the-scenes advocacy spurred  
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the passage of legislation that forced Pittsburgh to shore up its woefully  
underfunded pensions. 
 Our search for cooperative, consensus-based, regional solutions 
sometimes exposed us to another line of criticism. Some who favored  
local decision making saw the Institute as a proponent of regionalism, 
or the concept that regional bodies could make the best, most effective, 
and most equitable decisions on a host of issues. Sponsoring the  
Regional Water Management Task Force, holding a major forum on  
the possibility of city-county consolidation, and convening discussions 
on regional governance and tax base sharing made us easy targets  
for those who prefer to keep government small and simple.  
 But after more than 20 years, many county commissioners, state 
legislators, and other important decision makers of all political stripes 
continue to view the Institute of Politics as an invaluable provider  
of ideologically balanced policy forums and publications on issues  
of regional significance. The Institute’s geographic reach has gradually 
expanded beyond metropolitan Pittsburgh, as leaders from as far  
north as Erie and as far east as Philadelphia have asked to become 
involved in its activities, and Temple University even sought our  
assistance in order to replicate the idea.
One Special Relationship
 The continued success of the Institute of Politics can be attributed 
substantially to the fruit of one long-term mentoring relationship  
with a graduate student. Terry Miller grew up in poverty, living in  
a run-down Pittsburgh public housing community. As the daughter  
of a single mother on welfare who suffered with physical and mental 
health issues, Miller experienced all that goes along with that life—
hunger, neglect, and abuse. At an early age, Miller became the primary 
caretaker for her mother and brother. Then, at age 29, worn thin by 
her early life experiences, yet having risen to the executive offices  
as a human resources administrator at Koppers Company, Inc.,  
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she found herself in the office of a Pennsylvania Office of Vocational 
Rehabilitation counselor, who asked her a question she had never 
been asked before: “Have you ever thought of going to college?”  
And indeed she had not, because, as Miller recalled, “Back then,  
poor kids from the projects, no matter what color your skin, never 
thought or dreamed of such things.”  
 Miller went on to earn her bachelor’s and master’s degrees in 
social work, first encountering me when she took my community  
organizing class. Later, I was her field placement advisor and 
supported her efforts as she created the Pennsylvania Organization 
for Women in Early Recovery (POWER) during 1989–91. The orga-
nization is a long-term, gender-specific drug and alcohol treatment 
program. She is its founder and served as its first executive director. 
 In 1992, feeling exhausted and burned out after working 80 hours 
per week for three years to get POWER off the ground, Miller called 
me to discuss potential job opportunities. She was concerned that 
if she didn’t step down as executive director of POWER, she would 
hurt something she worked so hard to create.  As she put it, “Moe  
sympathized with me for about 15 seconds and then told me to come 
over to work with him at the Institute.” 
 Miller served ably as project administrator and later became 
assistant director for the Institute, where few knew her background 
until she shared it in dramatic fashion at a forum on welfare reform 
in 2004. After McManus left the Institute in 2005, the University 
initiated a search for his replacement but soon agreed with my  
insistence that the right person for the job was already on staff.  
Miller was officially introduced as the Institute’s new director at the 
opening session of the 2006 annual retreat. University Chancellor 
Mark A. Nordenberg commented after that session that he had never 
received such a rousing ovation just for mentioning a name. The 
response to his announcement was an unforgettable reflection of how 
widely Miller’s work has been appreciated. She developed a remarkably 
capable small staff, including the Institute’s longtime deputy director 
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of finance, Marie Hamblett. Her uniquely sensitive, unassuming,  
and unfailingly responsive leadership makes me feel very privileged, 
as my career nears its close, to consider the University of Pittsburgh 
Institute of Politics the last and most enduring major piece of my 
professional legacy.
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C H A P T E R  6
Protecting the Middle
 I have always exercised great caution about extrapolating  
from past experiences to present policy recommendations or future  
projections. Even when one can clearly define what happened in  
one time and place, applying that knowledge to solving issues  
in a different time and place remains uncertain. So I am hesitant 
to deduce best practices from my lifetime “in the middle” as a civic 
leader and mediator. Other experts have spelled out effectively  
how a successful mediator defines issues and guides the process  
of resolving them. As they have drawn on extensive research and  
a large number of cases, their conclusions are more reliable than 
reaching any conclusions from the series of single cases contained  
in my personal history. 
 With that large caveat, I do believe that my experiences offer 
some important lessons and highlight some of society’s most  
enduring challenges.
 • My experiences with settlement houses and neighborhood 
  organizations suggest that, even in an age characterized  
  by advanced technology, instant communication, and a highly 
  mobile population, the need for place-based institutions  
  remains. Our community “safe places” must adapt to changing 
  times, but they continue to provide a sense of belonging  
  and cultural awareness, enhance public safety, address  
  neighborhood-level differences, and empower communities  
  in their interactions with larger entities such as city  
  and county government and private foundations.
 • The 1960s War on Poverty, in which I participated as a  
  strategist in Pittsburgh, presented both the possibilities  
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  and the limitations of government action to address human need. 
  The essential challenge is to balance a safety net of protection 
  with incentives for economic advancement so as to lead  
  disadvantaged persons toward a better life without creating  
  dependency. We found that attempts to eradicate poverty that  
  were not directly tied to employment had limited success— 
  a lesson that echoed in the 1990s debate over welfare reform. 
  Civil rights movements over the last 50 years have provided 
  important opportunities for women and underrepresented  
  populations. However, communities have still not found a way  
  to eliminate the widespread use of violence to solve disputes.
 • The Greater Hartford Process experience remains a fascinating 
  case study of what can happen when powerful economic and 
  political forces with good intentions try to carry out civic change 
  with little understanding of how their efforts will impact local 
  communities or how those communities feel about the decision. 
  In its later stages, Process recovered its good name by working 
  to link disadvantaged communities, especially the growing 
  Puerto Rican component of Hartford’s population, with the city’s 
  elites. As the United States undergoes unprecedented demo- 
  graphic change, finding ways to link rather than divide new  
  and old groups will be increasingly important.
 • The success of the Institute of Politics suggests the value  
  of fostering regional policy development through informal 
  dialogue involving elected officials of different parties and other 
  civic leaders. Providing objective information and a space for 
  private interaction on regional issues, which tend to be more 
  pragmatically focused and less ideological in nature than  
  national and state issues, could reduce polarization in  
  communities across America.
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 The saying “May you live in interesting times” often is described  
as an ancient Chinese curse. I disagree. I feel fortunate to have lived in 
interesting times marked by startling technological change, increased 
social equality, and a growing sense of humanity’s global connectedness. 
I also have enjoyed stimulating interaction with an incredible range of 
thinkers, ideas, and social forces. I have found that living in the middle 
enables one to view life from many perspectives. And when being in the 
middle helps to bring people and communities together to achieve some-
thing significant, then it is definitely the most rewarding place to be.
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 My memoir, Finding Common Ground, is a walk back in time 
that relies on my own memory and understanding of past events,  
and so the contribution of others to the telling of my story was critical 
and incredibly valuable. I’m very grateful for the help I received in 
writing and editing the book, enriching its content, and financing its 
production as well as for the overall support I received in completing 
the task. The following are a few of the individuals who contributed  
to the project and of whom I am incredibly appreciative. 
 Thank you to Bruce Barron for his assistance in writing and editing 
and for his thoughtful and penetrating analysis. 
 Thank you to the 20 individuals who allowed me to interview 
them and who subsequently made significant contributions to the 
substance of the report. They each played an important role in my 
project through their commitment to help create a better society.  
Four of the interviewees, all cherished friends and colleagues of mine, 
 have since passed away. Dr. James V. Cunningham, Dr. David 
Epperson, Wendell Freeland, and Dr. Anne Jones all had remarkable 
careers and made enormous contributions to the community. They 
were among the best of humankind, each highly accomplished and 
caring with integrity and a deep commitment to social justice.  
 Thank you to Terry Miller, who initiated the idea for the memoir 
and developed funding. She has been a great friend and colleague  
and is an extraordinary leader of the Institute of Politics and in  
the community. 
 Thank you to Kerry O’Donnell of the Falk Foundation and  
Henry Beukema of the McCune Foundation for their financial and 
emotional support. 
 Thank you to Briana Mihok for her insightful editing and her 
counsel and support as she oversaw the production of the memoir. 
A C K N O W L E D G M E N T S 
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 Thank you to the University of Pittsburgh Department of  
Communications Services for the development of the final product. 
 Thank you to Tracy Papillon for interpreting my illegible hand-
writing with humor and grace and for typing the majority of the  
material for the memoir. 
 Finally, thank you to my wonderful, caring, and supportive wife, 
who in her own right has made major contributions to health care and 
education as a teacher and a social worker, and to my two sons, their 
wives, and my four grandchildren, who are the pride of my life. 
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